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The Fading Bright Line of Physical Presence: Did
KFC Corporation v. Iowa Department of Revenue Give
States the Secret Recipe for Repudiating Quill?
Adam B. Thimmesch'
INTRODUCTION
THE Supreme Court has long held that the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution prohibits states from imposing sales- or
use-tax collection requirements on vendors that do not have a physical
presence within their jurisdictions.' That limitation on state power was
challenged as an anachronism in the early 1990s, but the Supreme Court
affirmed the continued validity of its physical-presence mandate in Quill
Corporation v. North Dakota.3 Since that case, the legitimacy of the physical-
presence test has been largely accepted for purposes of state sales and use
taxes. 4 However, states' frustrations with that rule have only increased
during that time.
States' growing frustrations with the physical-presence rule are due in
large part to the explosive growth of the Internet in the two decades since
Quill. That technological development has expanded the pool of vendors
that are protected by the physical-presence rule from a relatively small group
of retailers (principally mail-order vendors) to a much larger group that is
buoyed significantly by Internet retailers. That expanded pool of protected
vendors, together with widespread consumer use-tax noncompliance, has
i Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. I would like to
thank Bruce Ackerman for his guidance and comments on earlier drafts and my family for
their patience and support.
2 See Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), abrogated by Quill
Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
3 Quill Corp v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
4 In recent years, an increasing number of state courts have refused to apply the physical
presence standard to state income taxes. Those courts have accepted Quill as it applies to sales
and use taxes, but note the Supreme Court's failure to apply that test to income tax cases.
(That is not to say that the Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to do so. As discussed
infra in Section II.A, the Court has refused to grant certiorari in a number of cases presenting
this question over the last two decades.) These actions by state courts (discussed infra in Sec-
tion II.A), and the concomitant lack of guidance from the Court, have led to significant debate
among taxpayers, tax authorities, tax practitioners, and academics regarding the applicability
of the physical-presence test to state income taxes. Sufficient ink has been dedicated to this
issue and this Article does not add to that debate.
100 KY. L.J. 339 (2012)
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
resulted in significant revenue losses for states across the nation.5 States
have responded to these losses by aggressively and continuously lobbying
Congress to legislatively overturn the physical-presence rule.6 Despite
those efforts, however, Congress has not yet given states the reprieve that
they seek.
States have responded to Congress's inaction in this area by taking
steps aimed at mitigating the impact of Quill's physical-presence directive.
Those actions include adopting statutory provisions attributing a physical
presence to remote vendors,7 adopting unique information-reporting
requirements that impose significant burdens on those vendors,' and
actively discussing challenging Quill's ongoing validity in court.9 The
Oklahoma legislature also recently boldly declared that "the sales and
use tax system established under Oklahoma law does not pose an undue
burden on out-of-state retailers"-a noted concern of the Quill court in
affirming the physical-presence standard. 0 Ultimately, however, none of
those efforts to mitigate Quill's impact have provided states with any real
relief from the physical-presence test." That test still requires that vendors
have some physical presence in the taxing state, something that many
Internet retailers lack.
5 The tax losses attributable to these factors were previously projected to be as much
as $I I billion in 2011. See Donald Bruce et al., State and Local Sales Tax Revenue Losses from E-
Commerce, 52 STATE TAX NOTES 537, 540 (2009).
6 Opposing bills have been presented in Congress through the years that would either
statutorily impose the physical-presence test or restrict or remove that test. Most recently, the
Main Street Fairness Act (introduced on July 29th, 201 ) would allow states that are members of
the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement to require remote vendors to collect their sales
and use taxes. Main Street Fairness Act, H.R. 2701, 1 Izth Cong. § 4(a)(i) (as referred to the
H.R. Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial and Admin. Law, Aug. 18, zo I); Main Street Fairness
Act, S. 1452, 112th Cong. § 4(a)(i) (as referred to the S. Comm. on Fin., July 19, 2011). Similar
provisions have been considered in recent Congressional sessions. See, e.g., STEyEN MAGUIRE
& NONNA A. NOTO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33261, INTERNET TAXATION: ISSUES AND LEG-
ISLATION I1, (2008), available at http://ipmall.info/hostedresources/crs/RL3326 1_080707.pdf;
STEVEN MAGUIRE & NONNA A. NOTO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33261, INTERNET TAxATION:
ISSUES AND LEGISLATION IN THE 109TH CONGRESS 9 (2oo6), available at http://www.ait.org.tw/
infousa/enus/economy/technology/docs/RL33261.pdf; STEVEN MAGUIRE & NONNA A. NOTO,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31929, INTERNET TAXATION: ISSUES AND LEGISLATION IN THE IO8TH
CONGRESS 10 (2004), available at http://ipmall.info/hostedresources/crs/RL 31929041217.
pdf.
7 See infra notes 123-25. For purposes of this Article, the terms "remote vendors," "out-of
state retailers," and "out-of-state vendors" refer to such persons who do not have a physical
presence within the taxing state.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 128-170.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 182-183.
1O Act of June 9, 201O, ch. 412, § 6,2010 Okla. Sess. Laws 1692, 1698.
I I And their prospects for doing so took an initial hit in January 2011, when the State
of Colorado was preliminarily enjoined from enforcing its new information-reporting law. See
infra text accompanying notes 157-162.
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States desiring a reprieve from the physical-presence rule therefore
must find either a new method of attributing a physical presence to such
retailers or obtain the yet-elusive reversal of that rule. Neither is an easy
task. However, the Iowa Supreme Court's decision in KFC Corporation v.
Iowa Department of Revenue may have introduced an avenue for effectively
achieving both." In that case, the Iowa Supreme Court upheld the state's
ability to impose its income tax on an out-of-state franchisor merely
because it received royalties from franchisees in the state. That decision
followed a long line of state-court decisions that rejected the physical-
presence standard in favor of an economic-nexus standard for purposes of
state income taxation. The case is unique, however, in that the court took
the extraordinary step of also finding that KFC had actually met Quils
physical-presence test. 3 The court came to that conclusion by relying on
two factors unrelated to the physical actions of KFC: (1) the use of KFC's
intellectual property by its franchisees in the state; and (2) KFC's derivation
of income based upon transactions occurring in the state.
14
The KFC court's reliance on those two factors greatly expanded the
types of activities that have been historically understood to create a
physical presence in a state and, in doing so, appears to ignore the very
basis and purpose of the physical-presence requirement. The KFC court's
rationale could thus provide states with the method for which they have
been looking to require sales- and use-tax collection and remittance from
Internet retailers, but it represents a stark deviation from Supreme Court
precedent and seems to have a limited basis in existing law. This Article
evaluates the scope of the KFC decision and whether it represents a
legitimate application, or an effective rejection, of the physical-presence
test.
To help understand this case in a historical context, Part I of this Article
reviews the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the limits on state
sales and use taxation under the Commerce Clause. That section discusses
the origin and development of the physical-presence test adopted in
National Bellas Hess and affirmed in Quill.
Part II discusses the various actions that have been taken by states
to limit the physical-presence test, from its outright rejection in cases
involving taxes other than sales or use taxes to state legislative action in
the sales and use tax area. That section looks at recent laws in Colorado,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Vermont, as well as recent actions by
state intergovernmental tax agencies challenging Quils authority. That
discussion sets the framework for KFC and its importance.
Part III discusses the KFC case and its Quill analysis. Part IV evaluates
12 KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 792 N.W.zd 308 (Iowa 2010), cert. denied, 2011
WL 45306o, at *i (Oct. 3,2011).
13 Id. at 323-24.
14 Id.
2OII-2012]
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that analysis and concludes that KFC must be read as a rejection of the
physical-presence test despite its statements to the contrary. Part V
evaluates Quill's continuing validity amid calls to the contrary.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Development of the Commerce Clause's Restrictions
on State Sales and Use Taxes
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution grants
Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."'" The Supreme
Court has interpreted this clause to grant both a positive power and a
negative power.' 6 That is, the Commerce Clause grants Congress an
affirmative power to regulate interstate commerce, as well as a negative or
"dormant" power to limit state taxation measures that would infringe on
Congress's right to do so.17
The Dormant Commerce Clause has developed over time from a strict
prohibition on state taxation of interstate commerce to a test requiring a
multi-factor analysis of the state tax regulation at issue. 18 In the context of
state sales and use taxes, the Court's analysis has focused on the boundaries
of states' power to require out-of-state vendors to collect and remit the
states' sales or use taxes. The basic framework of this analysis was formed
on one day in 1944, when the Court issued two complementary decisions-
McLeodv. J.E. Dilworth Co. 9 and General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission. 0
In McLeod, the Court ruled that the State of Arkansas could not impose
its sales tax on out-of-state transactions simply because the purchased goods
were delivered to consumers in the state."' The sellers that challenged
the Arkansas tax were Tennessee corporations principally operated in
Memphis."2 None of the sellers were qualified to do business in Arkansas
nor had any places of business in the state. 3 The transactions on which
'5 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
16 See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851); Brown v. Maryland,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 448-49 (1827); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)', 72-78 (1824).
17 WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION ' 4.O1[1][a]-[b] (3d ed. 201z), available at
Westlaw WGL-STATE. For a detailed discussion of the Dormant Commerce Clause, see
BORIS I. BITTKER, BITTKER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, ch. 6
(1999 & Supp. 2011).
I8 For a detailed history of the development of the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, see HELLERSTEIN, supra note 16,11 4.07-12.
19 McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
20 Gen. Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
21 McLeod, 322 U.S. at 330.
22 Id. at 328.
23 Id.
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Arkansas attempted to impose its sales tax were all purchases of goods
accepted in, and shipped from, Tennessee.1
4
The State of Arkansas argued that the imposition of its tax was
constitutionally firm because it could have levied the same tax on the
transactions in the form of a use tax 5 without violating the Constitution. 6
The Court recognized the similarity in result between the two taxes,
but adopted a formalistic approach, noting that sales and use taxes
are "different in conception" and are "assessments upon different
transactions."27 As a result, the Court rejected Arkansas's attempt to tax the
out-of-state transactions, holding that "[f]or Arkansas to impose a tax on
such transactions would be to project its powers beyond its boundaries and
to tax an interstate transaction. "28
In contrast to McLeod, the General Trading case involved the imposition
of a use tax on an in-state purchaser's use of goods purchased outside of
the state.2 9 The statute at issue imposed an obligation on the out-of-state
vendor to collect the use tax from the consumer and remit the same to the
state. 30 This difference in the action being taxed (the purchaser's use of
the goods rather than the purchase of the goods, as in McLeod) compelled
a different conclusion by the Court. The Court held that this imposition
of tax was proper because "[tihe exaction is made against the ultimate
consumer-the Iowa resident who is paying taxes to sustain his own state
government. ' 31 The Court was not influenced by the fact that the tax was
actually collected from the out-of-state retailer.32
Through these two cases, the Court created the basic structure for
analyzing state impositions of sales and use taxes, with states having much
greater power over the latter in connection with out-of-state sales. The
24 Id.
25 Sales and use taxes are different, but complementary, taxes. A sales tax is generally
imposed on retail transactions. Such taxes are generally collected by the retailer making the
sale, but the economic incidence falls on the consumer. See HELLERSTEIN, supra note I6 at 9
12.01. In contrast, use taxes are imposed on the use or consumption of taxable property or
services in the taxing state. Such taxes compensate the state for the tax revenue lost when a
taxpayer travels out of state to make a purchase. Id. at 9 16.oi[2]. Use taxes are thus imposed
at the same rate as the states' sales taxes, but taxpayers generally receive a credit against that
tax for any sales tax paid on the purchase of the goods in the other state. Id. A state's use tax
cannot have a broader base than a state's sales tax without running afoul of the Commerce
Clause's restriction on facially discriminatory taxes on out-of-state purchases. Id.
26 McLeod, 322 U.S. at 330.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Gen. Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335, 336 (1944).
30 Id. at 336-37.
31 Id. at 338.
32 Id. ("To make the distributor the tax collector for the State is a familiar and sanc-
tioned device.").
20]11-20][21
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Court did not, however, enunciate any precise limits on states' power to
impose use-tax collection obligations on remote vendors. That guidance
was finally provided ten years later in Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland.
3
Miller Brothers involved an attempt by the State of Maryland to require
the Miller Brothers furniture store, located in Delaware, to collect Maryland
use tax on products sold to Maryland residents. Miller Brothers had no place
of business or employees in Maryland, nor did it send any sales personnel
into the state.34 Its business activity with respect to Maryland consisted
of selling products to Maryland purchasers (some of whom took delivery
of the products in Maryland via Miller Brothers's trucks), engaging in
advertising that reached Maryland customers, and mailing certain circulars
to former customers, including Maryland residents.
35
The State of Maryland asserted that it had the ability to require Miller
Brothers to collect its use tax and seized a truck owned by Miller Brothers
when it was in Maryland delivering purchased goods. The state held Miller
Brothers liable for use tax on all goods that it sold to Maryland residents
from its Delaware store.36 Miller Brothers challenged this action as a
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution.
37
In its review of the Maryland case, the Court recognized that its
decisions regarding states' power to tax nonresidents were "not always
clear as to the grounds on which a tax is supported. ' 38 However, "the course
of decisions does reflect at least consistent adherence to one time-honored
concept: that due process requires some definite link, some minimum
connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks
to tax."39 The Court then undertook a review of its cases evaluating states'
power to tax nonresidents, but was unable to find any authority to support
Maryland's imposition of tax.4° The Court noted that Miller Brothers
had not invaded or exploited the market in Maryland, but that its sales
"resulted from purchasers traveling from Maryland to Delaware to exploit
its less tax-burdened selling market."'" On those facts, the Court found
that Maryland's imposition of a use-tax collection duty on the out-of-state
retailer violated the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
4
1
33 Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
34 Id. at 341.
35 Id. at 341-42.
36 Id. at 341.
37 Id
38 Id. at 344.
39 Id. at 344-45.
40 Id. at 345.
41 Id. at 347.
42 The Court noted that it did not need to consider the Commerce Clause implications
given its determination on the Due Process Clause. Id.
[Vol. IOO
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The Court evaluated the Miller Brothers standard again six years later in
Scripto, Inc. v. Carson,43 a case addressing the ability of the State of Florida
to require an out-of-state retailer to collect the state's use tax on items
that it sold and shipped to Florida consumers from its place of business in
Georgia." Scripto was based in Atlanta and did not own, lease, or maintain
any business locations in Florida, have any regular employees or agents
located in the state, or own or maintain any bank accounts or inventories
in the state.4 1 Scripto did, however, have a connection to the state in the
form of independent contractor brokers that solicited sales in the state.'
Any orders generated by those in-state brokers were sent to Atlanta for
approval and processing, and the brokers received commissions for such
sales. 47 Under the Florida law at issue, Scripto was responsible for collecting
Florida's use tax as a "dealer" in the state.
48
The Scripto Court applied the Miller Brothers standard that there must
be "some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the
person, property or transaction it seeks to tax."' 49 The Court found that the
necessary link was present in the case because Scripto's local representatives
had solicited sales within the state. 0 Scripto argued that it had no more of
a connection to the taxing state than did the taxpayer in Miller Brothers
because it had no personnel in the state-its only in-state representatives,
its brokers, were independent contractors rather than employees. The Court
rejected that argument and found that the state's imposition of tax did not
violate either the Due Process or Commerce Clauses of the U.S. Constitution
because Scripto had exploited the Florida market through the use of local
representatives. 1 The Court found Scripto's use of independent contractors
rather than employees to be "without constitutional significance."5
43 Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (960).
44 Id. at 207-08.
45 Id. at 208-09.
46 Id. at 209.
47 Id.
48 Id. at21o.
49 Id. at 210-Il (citation omitted).
5o Id. at z1.
51 Id. at zl1-3.
52 Id. at 211. The Court's ruling in Scripto was thus notable for two reasons. First, it
established that taxpayers cannot insulate themselves from taxation in a state merely by using
in-state independent contractors rather than employees. Second, it also extended the Miller
Brothers analysis to a Commerce Clause challenge. Thus, the Court set up a parallel test under
the Due Process and Commerce Clauses.
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B. Creating a Bright-Line Physical-Presence Test:
National Bellas Hess and Quill
Miller Brothers and Scripto set up parallel tests under the Due
Process and Commerce Clauses, but neither case created a concrete
test for evaluating whether the minimum-connection standard was
met in a particular case. It was clear that non-targeted sales to in-state
customers along with the occasional presence of delivery trucks in the
state was insufficient (as in Miller Brothers), whereas the use of in-state
independent contractors who continuously solicited sales (as in Scripto)
was sufficient to find a minimum connection. Beyond those situations,
however, the limitations placed on states when imposing use-tax-
collection obligations were unclear until the Court's 1967 decision in
National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue of the State of Illinois.53
1. National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue of the State of Illinois.-
National Bellas Hess again involved a dispute regarding a state's imposition
of a use-tax collection obligation on an out-of-state retailer.5 4 National
Bellas Hess was a mail-order house based in Missouri that made sales
to Illinois customers, but it did not maintain any offices, sales houses, or
distribution centers in Illinois, nor did it have any agents, salesman, or other
representatives in the state.55 National Bellas Hess created a connection with
Illinois by mailing catalogues to its active and recent customers throughout
the United States, including in Illinois, and by mailing advertising flyers
to past and occasional customers.56 Orders for goods from National Bellas
Hess were mailed to, and accepted by, the company at its principal place
of business in Missouri.5 Customers received the goods either by mail or
via common carrier.58 Illinois law required National Bellas Hess to collect
Illinois use tax based upon its limited actions in the state. 9 National Bellas
Hess challenged that'requirement as a violation of both the Due Process
and Commerce Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.'
The Court began its analysis of the case by reviewing its historical
decisions regarding the limitations imposed by those clauses and noting
its "sharp distinction .. .between mail order sellers with retail outlets,
solicitors, or. property within a State, and those who do no more than
communicate with customers in the State by mail or common carrier as part
53 Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S 753 (I967).
54 Id. at 754.
55 Id. at 753-54.
56 Id. at 754.
57 Id. at 754-55.
58 Id. at 755.
59 Id.
6o Id. at 756.
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of a general interstate business."'" (This distinction represents the Court's
first explicit recognition of a physical-presence requirement for state sales
and use taxation.) The Court declined to "obliterate" that distinction,
reasoning that:
if the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens upon
National were upheld, the resulting impediments upon the free
conduct of its interstate business would be neither imaginary
nor remote. For if Illinois can impose such burdens, so can
every other State, and so, indeed, can every municipality, every
school district, and every other political subdivision throughout
the Nation with power to impose sales and use taxes. The
many variations in rates of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in
administrative and record-keeping requirements could entangle
National's interstate business in a virtual welter of complicated
obligations to local jurisdictions with no legitimate claim to
impose "a fair share of the cost of the local government. 61
The Court thus determined that the State of Illinois's imposition of its
use-tax obligations on National Bellas Hess was impermissible under the
Commerce Clause.
63
2. Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Department of
Revenue.-Post-National Bellas Hess, the Court had the opportunity to
reiterate its Scripto holding in Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State
DepartmentofRevenue, a case evaluating the imposition of a gross receipts tax
on a taxpayer whose only presence within the taxing state was the use of a
single in-state sales representative. 64 Tyler Pipe sold products to customers
in Washington through the use of its in-state independent contractor, but
had no offices, property, or employees in the state.65 Tyler Pipe challenged
the tax assessment as a violation of the Commerce Clause.
The Supreme Court's analysis of the case was straightforward and
focused on the role that Tyler Pipe's in-state agent played in its ability to
exploit the market in Washington. The Court again rejected a formalistic
inquiry that rested on the legal classification of an in-state representative
and held that "the crucial factor governing nexus is whether the activities
performed in this state on behalf of the taxpayer are significantly associated
with the taxpayer's ability to establish and maintain a market in this state
for the sales. 66 The Court recognized that the case was a mere extension
6I Id.at 758.
62 Id. at 758-60 (footnotes omitted).
63 Id. at 760. Interestingly, the Court did not cite the Due Process Clause in its holding
despite National Bella Hess's challenge under that constitutional provision.
64 Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 249 (1987).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 249-50 (citing Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Rev., 7 15P2d 123,
126 (Wash. 1986)).
2011-2012]
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of Scripto and upheld the imposition of tax on Tyler Pipe based upon the
actions of its in-state agent.
67
3. Quill Corporation v. North Dakota.-The Court got another opportunity
to evaluate National Bellas Hess five years after Tyler Pipe (and thus twenty-
five years after National Bellas Hess) in Quill Corporation v. North Dakota.
68
The statute at issue in Quill imposed use-tax collection obligations on
mail-order retailers that placed three or more advertisements in the state
during a twelve-month period, without regard to whether those vendors
had business locations or sales representatives in the state.69 That statute
was therefore in clear conflict with National Bellas Hess.
North Dakota adopted its rule based upon an assumption that legal and
economic developments since National Bellas Hess had made its holding
obsolete. The Supreme Court of North Dakota agreed with that reasoning,
relying upon "the tremendous social, economic, commercial, and legal
innovations" since that case.7° The court thus held that the state could
impose a use-tax-collection obligation on Quill because of its "significant
economic presence within the State and its retained ownership of property
within the State."'" (Quill retained an interest in a few floppy diskettes that
contained software that it licensed to certain of its customers in the state.)"
Quill appealed this ruling to the Supreme Court, arguing that National
Bellas Hess was still valid.
The Quill court undertook its analysis by first "uncoupling" the
Constitutional safeguards provided by the Due Process and Commerce
Clauses.73 The Court held that the different purposes for those provisions
allowed for different standards, with the Due Process Clause requiring less
connection with a state than the Commerce Clause.74 The Court agreed
that the North Dakota statute did not violate the Due Process Clause.7"
The Quill court then turned to an analysis of the Commerce Clause,
briefly laying out the history of its jurisprudence under that provision
of the U.S. Constitution.76 The Court noted that "[wihile contemporary
Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not dictate the same result were
the issue to arise for the first time today, [National] Bellas Hess [wals not
67 Id. at 25o-5.
68 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
69 Id. at 3o-03.
70 State v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 208 (N.D. '99I).
71 Id. at z9.
72 Quill, 504 U.S. at 302 n.i.
73 Id. at 305-06.
74 Id. at 305.
75 Id. at 3o8.
76 Id. at3o9-11.
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inconsistent with ... [its] recent cases."" The Court thus rejected North
Dakota's argument that the Court's intervening decisions had undercut
the Commerce Clause holding of National Bellas Hess, noting that it had
continued to cite that case with approval.78 The Court also explained the
analytic differences between the Due Process and Commerce Clauses-the
former being concerned with "the fundamental fairness of governmental
activity"79 and the latter being focused on "concerns about 'the effects of
state regulation on the national economy."8 0 The Court's prohibition of
discrimination against and undue burdens upon interstate commerce was a
result of the latter concern."
Having laid this framework for its decision, the Court next defended its
physical-presence test by explaining that "[u]ndue burdens on interstate
commerce may be avoided not only by a case-by-case evaluation of the
actual burdens imposed by particular regulations or taxes, but also, in some
situations, by the demarcation of a discrete realm of commercial activity
that is free from interstate taxation."8" The Court was not blind to the
artificiality of such a bright-line test, but held that such artificiality was
"more than offset by the benefits of a clear rule."8 3 Namely, "[sluch a rule
firmly establishes the boundaries of legitimate state authority to impose a
duty to collect sales and use taxes and reduces litigation concerning those
taxes."' The Court found that such benefits were important because the
77 Id. at 3 II.
78 Id. at3II-1z, 314.
79 Id. at 312.
8o Id.
8i Id. To this final point, the Court included a footnote in its opinion that has framed
much of the debate around the case. Footnote six of the Court's opinion reads as follows:
North Dakota's use tax illustrates well how a state tax might unduly burden
interstate commerce. On its face, North Dakota law imposes a collection duty
on every vendor who advertises in the State three times in a single year. Thus,
absent the Bellas Hess rule, a publisher who included a subscription card in three
issues of its magazine, a vendor whose radio advertisements were heard in North
Dakota on three occasions, and a corporation whose telephone sales force made
three calls into the State, all would be subject to the collection duty. What is more
significant, similar obligations might be imposed by the Nation's 6,ooo-plus taxing
jurisdictions.
Id. at 313 n.6.
82 Id. at314-15.
83 Id. at315.
84 Id. Justice White questioned whether the physical-presence rule would actually pro-
vide the litigation-reduction benefit that the Court espoused, noting that "[rleasonable minds
surely can, and will, differ over what showing is required to make out a 'physical presence'
adequate to justify imposing responsibilities for use tax collection .... [lit is a sure bet that
the vagaries of 'physical presence' will be tested to their fullest in our courts." Id. at 330-31
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This concern has proven to be true,
but focuses on only one-half of the equation. To quote the Michigan Court of Appeals, "the
'bright-line' of Quill does not cut as cleanly on both sides. It definitively answers the ques-
tion who cannot be taxed ... but leaves somewhat open the question who may be taxed."
Magnetek Controls, Inc. v. Revenue Div., Dep't of Treasury, 562 N.W.zd 219, 222 n.5 (Mich.
2011-20121
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uncertainty and confusion present in that area of state taxation represented
a "quagmire."' Further, the court was concerned that the lack of a bright-
line rule would leave "much room for controversy and confusion and little
in the way of precise guides."'  In contrast, "a bright-line rule in the area
of sales and use taxes ... encourages settled expectations and, in doing so,
fosters investment by businesses and individuals."87 The Court recognized
that the mail-order industry's growth in the preceding twenty-five years
was due in part to the bright-line test established in National Bellas Hess."
The Court also cited principles of stare decisis in its decision 9 and noted
that its decision was "made easier" because Congress not only had the
power to resolve the issue, but that Congress was also better equipped to
do so.' Thus, the Court recognized that "even if we were convinced that
Bellas Hess was inconsistent with our Commerce Clause jurisprudence, 'this
very fact [might] giv[e us] pause and counse[l] withholding our hand, at
least for now. Congress has the power to protect interstate commerce from
intolerable or even undesirable burdens."' 9'
Quill stands as the Court's last word on the applicability and efficacy
of the physical-presence test. Further, as discussed above, Congress
has declined the Court's invitation to address that test on its own. The
physical-presence test thus stands today as the safeguard upon which
remote vendors rely to shield themselves from multistate use-tax burdens.
Ct. App. 1997).
85 Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 (internal quotation marks omitted).
86 Id. (quoting Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-58
(1959)).
87 Id. at 316.
88 Id. Professor Hellerstein notes that the QuillCourt's focus on the mail-order industry
may counsel towards limiting the physical-presence test to that industry. HELLERSTEIU, supra
note 16,(1 19.0213][b] (Supp. No. 3 2010) ("Many of the reasons the Court advanced for ad-
hering to the physical-presence standard relate principally, if not exclusively, to sales and use
taxes on the mail-order industry.... Quill, therefore, may arguably be read to have established
a 'bright-line' physical-presence standard only for sales and use taxes on the mail-order indus-
try alone."). He quickly offers a counter argument that seems to have the better of the issue.
As he notes, his analysis of Quil's potential limitation
is not to suggest that such a reading is the only plausible reading Quill may be giv-
en. Indeed, as an original matter, one would be hard put to justify a constitutional
rule that applied to only one industry. It is, after all, not an administrative code but
'a constitution we are expounding.' Moreover, the creation of a constitutional 'safe
harbor' for only one industry has the feel of a legislative rather than an adjudicative
determination, which tends to validate Justice Scalia's disenchantment with the
entire edifice of the Court's negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted).
89 Quill, 504 U.S. at 317-18.
90 Id. at318.
91 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S.
609, 637 (198 1) (White, J., concurring)).
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II. STATE LIMITATIONS ON THE PHYSICAL-PRESENCE 8TANDARD
States, not surprisingly, disfavor the physical-presence test. Many have
therefore sought to limit the scope of that test by whatever means available,
including by rejecting the test for taxes other than sales and use taxes,
passing legislation to bypass that test, and engaging in intergovernmental-
agency action to do the same. Each of those actions is discussed briefly
below.
A. State Judicial Limitations of the Physical-Presence Standard
to Sales and Use Taxes
1. Geoffrey v. South Carolina Tax Commission.--Quill's physical-presence
test stood for only one year before a state court found it applicable only to
sales and use taxes. 9 In Geoffrey Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, the
South Carolina Supreme Court declined to extend the Quill test beyond
sales and use taxes and thus held that the state could impose its income tax
on an out-of-state company with no physical presence in the state.93 The
taxpayer in Geoffrey was an out-of-state company that licensed intellectual
property to a related entity (Toys R Us) operating in the state.94 During the
years at issue, South Carolina Code section 12-7-230 imposed the state's
corporate income tax on foreign and domestic corporations "transacting,
conducting, doing business, or having an income within the jurisdiction" of
the state.95 The state asserted that Geoffrey was subject to tax in the state
because it earned income from the use of its intellectual property in the
state under its licensing agreements with Toys R Us. Geoffrey challenged
the imposition of tax as a violation of both the Due Process and Commerce
Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.
The South Carolina Supreme Court found that neither the Due Process
nor Commerce Clauses of the U.S. Constitution were violated by the state's
imposition of tax on Geoffrey. With respect to the Due Process Clause,
the court found that "Geoffrey purposefully directed its activities toward
South Carolina," that it had the required minimum connection with the
state, and that "South Carolina ha[d] conferred benefits upon Geoffrey to
which the challenged tax [was] rationally related."'
Turning to Geoffrey's Commerce Clause challenge, the court stated
that "[ilt is well settled that the taxpayer need not have a tangible, physical
92 Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993).
93 Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 21-23.
94 Id. at I6-17.
95 S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-7-230 (1992) (repealed 1995) (current version at S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 12-6-530 (201o),12-6-22Io(A) (2010)).
96 Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 19-20, 22.
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presence in a state for income to be taxable there."97 The court dismissed
Geoffrey's argument that Quill's physical-presence standard applied with
a mere footnote stating that the Quill decision itself had "noted that the
physical presence requirement had not been extended to other types of
taxes [beyond sales and use taxes]." 98 Geoffrey petitioned the Supreme
Court to review the case, but the Court denied that request."
2. Physical Presence after Geoffrey.-From 1993 to 2004, state courts
vacillated with respect to whether Quillapplied to taxes other than sales and
use taxes. Courts in Illinois, 100 New Mexico, 10 1 North Carolina,' Ohio, 103
and Washington °4 all held that Quill did not so apply. In contrast, courts
in Tennessee, 105 Texas, 1°6 and New Jersey'017 did extend Quill beyond sales
and use taxes. The tide shifted significantly towards state taxing authorities
and against taxpayers beginning in 2005.
On June 27, 2005, the West Virginia Circuit Court reversed the West
Virginia Office of Tax Appeals, holding that MBNA Bank, an out-of-state
credit card company, had sufficient nexus with the state (for purposes of the
state's income tax) based merely upon its solicitation of, and business with,
West Virginia customers. 108 The West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed this
decision in 2006, and the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the case
in 2007.109
On August 24,2005, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division,
reversed the New Jersey Tax Court and held that an out-of-state intangible
97 Id. at 23.
98 Id. n.4 (citing Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992)).
99 Geoffrey, 510 U.S. 992 (993). The Supreme Court's Commerce Clause analysis is
subject to criticism on many grounds. See HELLERSTEIN, supra note 16, I 6.11[2] (Supp. No.
3 2oo).
1oo Borden Chems. & Plastics, L.P. v. Zehnder, 726 N.E.zd 73, 8o (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
I10. Kmart Props., Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 131 P.3d 27, 35-36 (N.M. Ct. App.
zoo), cert. granted, 40 P3d ioo8 (N.M. 2002), cert. quashed and order issued sub nom., Kmart
Corp. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 131 P.3d 22,22-23,27 (N.M. 2005).
102 A & F Trademark, Inc. v. Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187, 193-96 (N.C. Ct. App. 20 ) (de-
clining to adopt position that Quill applies to all taxes).
103 Couchot v. State Lottery Comm'n, 659 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ohio 1996).
104 Gen. Motors Corp. v. City of Seattle, 25 P.3 d 1022, 1028-29 (Wash. Ct. App. zoo).
105 J.C. Penney Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 19 S.W.3d 831, 839 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1.999).
io6 Rylander v. Bandag Licensing Corp., 18 S.W.3d 296, 299-300 (Tex. App. 2000).
107 Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 21 N.J. Tax 200,207-19 (N.J. Tax Ct. 2003), rev'd,
879 A.2d 1234 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2oo5), aft'd, 908 A.2d 176 (N.J. 2006).
1o8 Steager v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 2oo5 WL 1978490 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. 2005), aff'dsub
nom., Tax Comm'r v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d 226 (W. Va. 2006).
1o9 Tax Comm'r v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.zd 226, 234 (W. Va. 2006), cert. denied,
551 U.S. 1141 (2007).
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holding company"' had nexus with New Jersey for income-tax purposes
based simply upon its receipt of royalty income from its related-party
licensor in the state."' The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed that
decision in 2006, and the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the case
in 2007.111
On December 23, 2005, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that
no physical presence was required under the Commerce Clause for the state
to impose its income tax on an out-of-state, intangible holding company. 3
The New Mexico Supreme Court followed this decision six days later with
its determination in Kmart Corp. v. Taxation & Revenue Department, 131 P.3d
22 (N.M. 2005 ), another case involving an intangible holding company."4
'The aforementioned cases do not stand alone. Judicial decisions
and administrative rulings in Arizona,"' Florida,'l 6 Indiana," 7 Iowa,"'
iio Much of the evolution of the economic-nexus concept has occurred in cases involv-
ing the intangible holding company structure (IHC) or passive investment company structure
(PIC). See Sheldon H. Laskin, Only a Name? Trademark Royalties, Nexus, and Taxing that Which
Enriches, 22 AKRON TAX J. I, 8-16 (2007). Although a discussion of the IHC or PIC structure
is beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that IHC or PIC cases involve related
taxpayers and is a structure that is typically created rather than one that forms organically. For
a brief discussion of this structure, see id. at 5-8.
iii Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 879 A.2d 1234, 1241-42 (N.J. Super..Ct. App.
Div. 2005).
i12 Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 9o8A.2d at 177 (N.J. zoo6),cerr. denied, 551 U.S.
1131 (2007). The New Jersey Supreme Court later reiterated its economic-nexus holding. See
Praxair Tech., Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 988 A.2d 92 (2009).
113 Geoffrey, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 132 P.3d 632 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005).
114 Kmart Corp. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 131 P.3d 22, 23 (N.M. 2005). The proce-
dural history of this case is unique. The New Mexico Supreme Court originally granted certio-
rari on two issues: first, whether the state's imposition of its gross receipts tax on the taxpayer
was proper, and second, whether the state's imposition of its income tax on the taxpayer was
proper. The court's decision held against the state on the first issue on statutory grounds and
quashed certiorari on the income tax issue, effectively upholding the court of appeals' find-
ings on that issue. Id. For further discussion of this case and its procedural history, see Walter
Hellerstein, Green Light, Red Light, or Blue Light? New Mexico Supreme Court Sends Mixed Signals
with KmarDecision, 39 STATE TAx NOTES 141 (zoo6).
115 See [Redacted), Case No. 2007ooo83-C (Ariz. Dep't of Revenue Decision Mar. 28,
2oo8), available at http:llwww.azdor.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=9ZY8i7xZVNE%3d&tabi
d=1o5&mid=474 (finding that physical presence does not extend to corporate business tax).
116 See Fla. Dep't of Revenue Op. No. 07CI-007 (Oct. 17, 2007), available at https://
taxlaw.state.fl.us/wordfiles/CIT%2oTAA%2oo7C 1-0o7.doc (expressing that the physical pres-
ence requirement does not extend to corporate income tax).
117 MBNAAm. Bank, N.A. v. Ind. Dep't of State Revenue, 895 N.E.2d 140, 142-43 (Ind.
T.C. 2008).
118 KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 792 N.Wzd 308, 325-28 (Iowa 20io), cert.
denied, zoj i WL 453016o, at *i (U.S. Oct. 3, 201).
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Louisiana,1 9 Massachusetts,' Missouri,' and Washington' have all
rejected the application of the physical-presence test to taxes other than
sales and use taxes. The great weight of the authority has thus rejected the
application of Quill outside of those taxes, and all but the most optimistic
of taxpayers expect that trend to continue unless and until the Supreme
Court determines to review the issue.
B. State Legislative Actions Eroding the Physical-Presence Requirement
for State Sales and Use Taxes
State legislatures have not been blind to the trend rejecting a physical-
presence test for purposes of state income taxation. States thus have not
been shy to impose their state income or business-activity taxes based upon
an economic-nexus concept rather than a physical-presence standard.2 3
In contrast, state legislatures generally have succumbed to the Court's
physical-presence mandate for state sales and use taxes. States have instead
focused their energies on finding ways to attribute a physical presence to
out-of-state retailers. From related-party attributional nexus provisions
2 4
to the current trend towards Amazon-style affiliate-nexus provisions,'
19 Bridges v. Geoffrey, Inc., 984 So. 2d 115, 128 (La. Ct. App. 2008).
12o Geoffrey, Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 899 N.E.2d 87, 94-95 (Mass. 2009), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 2853 (2009); Capital One Bank v. Comm'r of Rev., 899 N.E.2d 76, 84 (Mass. 2009),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2827 (2009).
121 Acme Royalty Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, No. 99-2839 RI, 2002 WL 200921, at *I[ (Mo.
Admin. Hearing Comm'n Jan. 3, 2002), rev'd on other grounds, 96 S.W.3d 72 (Mo. zooz); Gore
Enter. Holdings, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, No. 99-2856 RI, zooz-WL 200918, at *8 (Mo. Admin.
Hearing Comm'n Jan. 3, 2ooz), rev'don other grounds, 96 S.W.3d 72 (Mo. zooz).
122 Lamtec Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 246 P.3d 788, 794 (Wash. 201 1), cert. denied, 2011
WL 4530146, at *1 (zo1).
123 See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 231oI(b) (West Supp. 201 ); CONN. GEN. STAT. §
12-2 16a (Supp. 2o0); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 575 i.o (H) (LexisNexis Supp. zo) I).
124 These provisions attribute nexus to out-of-state retailers based upon their relation-
ships with entities that operate in the taxing state. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-23-19
° (LexisNex-
is 2003); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 3 9 -26-102(3)(b)(II) (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-8-2(8)(J) (Supp.
2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-3611(3) (Supp. 2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 423.I(45)-(46) (West
Supp. 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79 -3702(h)(2) (Supp. zoio); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139.340(2)(a)
(West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 297A.66, subd. i(a)(i) (West 2oio); N.Y. TAX LAW § 1 Ios(b)
(8) (McKinney Supp. 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5741.O1(I)(5) (LexisNexis 2008); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 1401(9) (West Supp. 201 1); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-12-107 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2009); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 77.51(13g)(d) (West 2011); 2011 -4 Ark. Adv. Legis. Serv. 484
(LexisNexis).
125 These provisions attribute nexus to out-of-state retailers based upon their contrac-
tual relationships with in-state personnel who refer customers to the retailer for consideration.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-407(a)(12)(L) (West Supp. 2011); 35 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN.
105/2 (West Supp. 2011); N.Y. TAX LAw § I ioi(b)(8)(vi) (McKinney Supp. 201 ; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 105- 164.8(b)(3) (20o9); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44- 1 8-15(a)(2) (201O); 2011-4 Ark. Adv. Legis.
Serv. 484. (LexisNexis); 2011-3 Vt. Adv. Legis. Serv. 188-89 (LexisNexis) (effective on the
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states have looked for new ways of establishing a physical presence by out-
of-state entities through in-state parties' actions. However, attribution can
only get a state so far, and two states-Colorado and Oklahoma-abandoned
that approach during their 2010 legislative sessions.2 6 Two more-South
Dakota and Vermont-joined them in 2011.127 Those states broke new
ground by eschewing statutes simply requiring use-tax collection by out-
of-state vendors in favor of statutes that impose information-reporting or
information-provision requirements on those venders. 2 8 These new laws
serve two principal functions. First, they address the use-tax information
gap by requiring actions that notify consumers of their use-tax obligations.
Second, they impose compliance costs on remote vendors that potentially
economically compel such vendors to voluntarily collect the states' sales
taxes. (As shown below, this second function is principally implicated by
the Colorado statute.) These statutes are discussed briefly below.
1. Colorado Sales Tax Information-Reporting Statute.-The Colorado
legislature originally considered a bill that would have imposed use-tax
collection obligations on out-of-state retailers that had affiliates in the
state. ' 9 The legislature instead adopted a set of burdensome information-
reporting requirements that are imposed on retailers who make sales to
date that fifteen or more states have adopted similar rules, as determined by the attorney gen-
eral). For an introduction to these laws, their constitutional dimensions, and their labeling as
"Amazon" laws," see Edward A. Zelinsky, New York's 'Amazon'Law: ConstitutionalBut Unwise,
54 STATE TAx NOTES 715 (2009).
126 Act of Feb. 24, 2oio, ch. 9, 2010 Colo. Sess. Laws 55; Act of June 24, 2010, ch. 412, §
2, 2010 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 1692, 1695 (West).
127 Act of June 30, 2o1I, ch. 59, 2011 S.D. Sess. Laws 159; Act of May 6, 2ol 1, ch. 32,
§ 36b, 2oi Vt. Acts & Resolves 37, 38. The California legislature also considered similar
information-reporting requirements, but it ultimately only passed into law more traditional,
attributional-nexus provisions. See Act of June 28, 2011, ch. 7, 2011 Cal. Stat. (yet to be pub-
lished); John Buhl, Sears and Wal-Mart Pursuing Amazon Online Affiliates, 59 STATE TAx NOTES
759, 759 (201 I); Karen Setze, California Lawmakers Again Proposing 'Amazon' Laws, 59 STATE
TAX NOTES 235, 235-36 (201 I). After much resistance and lobbying by Amazon, however, that
law was ultimately repealed in a unique settlement. See Act of Sept. 23, 2011, ch. 313, 2011
Cal. Stat. (forthcoming); John Buhl, California Lawmakers andAmazon Reach Tentative Deal, 61
STATE TAx NOTES 691, 691-92 (2011); Amy Hamilton, Amazon Proposes Deal in California, 61
STATE TAx NOTES 616 (2011); Zelinsky, supra note 124, at 83. Under the new law, the effective
date of the state's nexus-attribution provisions is delayed pending the passage of a federal law
overturning the physical-presence rule by July 31, 201 2. Act of Sept. 23, 2011, ch. 315, § 6,2011
Cal. Stat. (forthcoming).
128 As discussed infra note 171, the Vermont legislation is actually a hybrid. That legisla-
tion imposes an information-provision requirement until a number of states have adopted leg-
islation similar to that discussed supra note 12. Act of May 24, 2011, Pub. L. No. 45, § 37(13),
2011 Vt. Acts & Resolves 169, I88.
129 Joe Hand, Colorado Senate Approves 'Amazon' Law, 55 STATE TAx NOTES 468, 468
(2010).
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Colorado customers'3 ° but who do not collect the state's sales or use tax.
13
1
A de minimis rule exempts retailers who make less than $100,000 in sales
to Colorado purchasers during the prior calendar year and who reasonably
expect to be within that limit for the current year.
3
1
This law (the "Colorado Act") imposes three information-reporting
requirements. The firs't is a transaction-based notice that must be provided
to Colorado purchasers during the course of their purchase transaction.
3
The second is an annual report that must be provided to Colorado
purchasers who make $500 or more of purchases from the retailer during
the calendar year.13 The third is an annual summary that must be provided
to the Colorado Department of Revenue.' 35 These are discussed briefly
below.
a. Transactional Notice.
The transactional notice required by the Colorado Act must be provided
anywhere that the seller indicates that no tax is due on the transaction or on
each invoice.'36 If no invoice is provided, the notice must be provided "as
part of the sale, either immediately before, as part of, or immediately after
the sale."' 37 The notice must inform the purchaser that the retailer does
not collect Colorado sales or use tax, that "[tihe purchase is not exempt
from [such taxes] merely because it is made over the Internet or by other
remote means," and that Colorado requires the purchaser to file a sales or
use tax return reporting any non-taxed purchases and to pay tax on such
purchases. 3 A penalty of $5 applies to every sale to a Colorado purchaser
for which the required transactional notice does not appear.'39
13o The Colorado Department of Revenue has enacted regulations defining the term
"Colorado purchaser' to mean, "[w]ith respect to sales of goods that are shipped ... a purchas-
er that requests the goods be shipped to Colorado." I COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-21-1 1Z.3.5(I)(b)
(i) (2010). Where goods are purchased by one party for shipment to another in Colorado, "the
Colorado purchaser is the purchaser of the goods, not the recipient of the goods." Id.
131 COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-1 12(3.5)(c)-(d) (2O i).
"132 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-21-I Iz.3.5(I)(a)(iii) (2oo).
133 Id.§ 39-2 I-1 12.3.5( i)(c); see also id. § 39-2 1-1 12.3.5(2).
134 COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-I 12(3.5)(d)(I)(A) (2o1); 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-21-1 12-
3-5(3)(a), (c) (2oio).
135 COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-112(3.5)(d)(II)(A) (zoi ); 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-21-112-
3.5(3)(a), (c) (2010).
136 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-21-112.3.5(2)(a) (2010).
137 Id. § 39-21- 12.3.5(z)(a)(ii).
138 Id. § 39-2 -I12.3 .5 (2)(b)(i)-(iii).
139 Id. § 39-2I-I iz. 3.5(z)(f)(i). Penalty-mitigation applies in certain circumstances. Id.
§ 39-21-I 12.3.5(2)(f)(ii), (iii).
[Vol. ioo
201 1-2012] FADING BRIGHT PHYSICAL PRESENCE
b. Annual Purchase Summary.
The annual purchase summary required by the Colorado Act is an
annual report that must be provided to each of the out-of-state retailer's
Colorado customers and must provide a summary of the dates of the
Colorado customer's purchases, the types of items purchased, and the dollar
amounts of the purchases. 40 The notice must also inform the purchaser
that (i) the State of Colorado requires him, her, or it to file a sales or use tax
return at the end of the year to report and pay tax on the taxable purchases
for which no tax has been collected 4' and (ii) that the retailer is required
by law to inform the Colorado Department of Revenue of the total dollar
value of purchases made by the purchaser during the year (but not any
other information about those purchases). 42 The Notice must be provided
only to consumers whose Colorado purchases equal or exceed $500 during
the year 143 and must be sent by January 31 of each year.144 A penalty of $10
applies to each annual purchase summary that is required to be sent but
that is not sent by the out-of-state vendor.
45
Of particular interest, the Colorado Act and administrative regulations
thereunder require that the annual purchase summary be sent to the
Colorado purchasers by first-class mail and prohibit it from being included
with any other shipments from the retailer to the customer. 46 In addition,
the envelope containing the summary must be "prominently marked" with
the words "'Important tax document enclosed."
' ' 47
c. Customer Information Report.
The third element of the Colorado Act is a customer information report
that must be filed with the Colorado Department of Revenue. 48 This
report must contain the names and addresses of all Colorado purchasers
and the total dollar amount of the purchases made by such purchasers for
140 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3 9 -21-112(3.5)(d)(I)(A) (2011); I COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-21-i1z-
3.5 (3)(a)(ii) (zoo).
141 COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-I 12(3.5)(d)(I)(A) (201 I); 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-21-112-
3.5 (3)(a)(iii) (zoo).
142 COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-I I2(3.5)(d)(II)(A) (2011 ); 1 CoLo. CODE REGS. § 39-21-112-
3.5 (3)(a)(iv) (z0).
143 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-21-I I2-3.5(3)(c)(i) (2OIO).
144 Id. § 39-21-112-3.5(3)(a)(vi).
145 Id. § 39-21-1 12-3.5(3)(d)(i). As is the case with the transactional notice, certain pen-
alty-mitigation provisions apply. See id. § 39-21-I 12-3.5(3)(d)(ii)-(iii).
146 COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-112(3.5)(d)(I)(B) (2o1); 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-21-112-
3.5 (3)(a)(i) (2010).
147 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-2I-I 12-3.5(3)(a)(i) (20101).
148 COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-I 12(3.5)(d)(II)(A) (2011); 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-21- I2-
3.5(4)(a) (zoIO).
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the prior calendar year. 49 Under the department's regulations, retailers are
prohibited from disclosing any information regarding the products that
their customers purchase.5 0 The customer information report must be filed
by March 1 of each year.'
A penalty of ten dollars applies for each Colorado customer that the
retailer fails to include on the annual filing.' Penalty-mitigation provisions
apply to failures to provide this filing in certain situations.5 3
d. Purpose of the Colorado Act.
Analysis of these three reporting requirements quickly reveals the
ultimate purpose of the Colorado Act-to impose burdens on out-of-state
retailers that are so onerous as to make the actual collection of the state's
use tax a less burdensome choice. This is highlighted principally by the
requirements imposed by the annual purchase summary, many of which
appear to serve no information-gathering justification.
As described above, the annual purchase summary requires not only
that the non-collecting retailer provide its Colorado purchasers with certain
information related to their use-tax obligations, but also imposes significant
restrictions on the manner in which the information must be provided. The
new requirements prohibit vendors from sending the summary with any
other information or product sent to the customer, require that the summary
be sent by first class mail (currently costing the retailer at least forty-
four cents per customer), ' and require that it be included in a specially
printed envelope. 5 Those requirements cannot be justified simply on
an information-reporting basis. Rather, the extent of those requirements
evidences the state's true intent-to shift the cost-benefit analysis in favor
of collecting the state's use tax.
This unique attempt at avoiding Quill presents significant constitutional
questions under the Commerce Clause. 5 6 The information-reporting
149 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-21-I 12-3.5(4)(a) (2010).
i5o Id. § 39-2I-1 I2-3.5(4)(a)(iv). For a review of the Constitutional uncertainty that the
required provision of such information can create, see Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d
1154, 1172 (W.D. Wash. zoio) (holding that North Carolina's attempt to gather customer iden-
tifying information coupled with information about particular purchases by those customers
violated the First Amendment and the federal Video Privacy Protection Act).
151 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 3 9 -21-112(3.5)(d)(II)(A) (2O1i).
152 Id. § 39-21-I IZ(3.5)(d)(111)(B); I COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-21-i 12(3.5)(4)(f)(i) (2010).
153 COLO. REV. STAT. § 3 9 -21-112(3.5)(d)(lll)(B) (zoio); I COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-21-
112-3.5 (4)(f(ii-(iii) (2OI11).
154 First-Class Mail, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, https://www.usps.com/ship/first-
class.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2011 ).
155 COLO. REv. STAT. § 39-21-112(3.5)(d)(I)(B) (201 i); i COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-21-112-
3.5(3)(a)(i).
156 See, e.g., Stephen P. Kranz et al., Colorado ' End Run: Clever Coercive, and Unconstitu-
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requirements impose the type of burdensome restrictions on interstate
commerce that the Quill court invalidated. Additionally, the information-
reporting requirements functionally apply only to out-of-state retailers,
raising questions as to its discriminatory impact on interstate commerce.
The Colorado Act raises significant questions under other provisions of the
U.S Constitution as well." 7 As could be expected, litigation challenging this
new law was initiated shortly after its enactment.
e. Legal Challenge to the Colorado Act.
On June 30, 2010, the Direct Marketing Association (the "DMA") filed
suit against the State of Colorado in the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado." 8 The DMA argued that the Colorado Act violated a
number of state and federal constitutional provisions, including the Due
Process and Commerce Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.159 On August
13, 2010, the DMA filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against
the enforcement of the Colorado Act based upon its Commerce Clause
claims.16°The District Court granted that motion on January 26, 2011.16 The
court held that there was a substantial likelihood that the act violated the
Commerce Clause by (1) imposing its information-reporting requirements
only on out-of-state retailers 6 and thus discriminating against interstate
commerce and (2) imposing burdens that are "inextricably related in kind
and purpose to the burdens condemned in Quill."'63The court granted the
DMA's motion for summary judgment and made its preliminary injunction
permanent on March 3 0 .164
tional, 56 STATE TAX NOTES 55 (20io). Butsee, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, The Constitutionality (and
Futility) of Colorado's 'Amazon' Law, 56 STATE TAX NOTES 113 (2010).
157 See Kranz et al., supra note 155 (discussing those potential violations).
158 Complaint, Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Huber, 2011 WL 250556 (D. Colo. June 30, zoo)
(No. I'1 0-CV-0 1546), 201oWL 2724158.
159 Id. at 1-2.
I6o Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Huber, 2011 WL 250556
(D. Colo. Aug. 13, 2010) (No. 10-cv-01546), 2010 WL 6646490.
161 Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Huber, No. 10-cv-01546-REB-CBS (D. Colo. Jan. z6, zoi1)
(order granting preliminary injunction).
162 Id. at 4. The court recognized that the act's information-reporting requirements
would technically also apply to in-state retailers who did not collect sales tax in violation of
Colorado law. Those retailers would be doing so, however, in violation of Colorado law and the
court felt that the new law's impact on those retailers was negligible compared to its impact
on out-of-state retailers. Id. at 5-7.
163 Id. at 5.
164 Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Huber, No. Io.cv-01546-REB-CBS (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2012).
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2. Oklahoma Legislation.-On May 28, 2010, the Oklahoma legislature
passed H.B. 2359 (the "Oklahoma Act"), which contained an information-
reporting statute based upon the Colorado law enacted earlier in the year.16 s
Although the Oklahoma Act was based upon the Colorado Act, the scope
of reporting requirements under the former is much more limited. The
Oklahoma law requires only a transactional notice.
The Oklahoma transactional notice is required of any retailer that is
"not currently registered to collect and remit Oklahoma sales and use
tax" and "who makes sales of tangible personal property from a place of
business outside of Oklahoma to be shipped to Oklahoma for use and who
is not required to collect Oklahoma sales or use taxes."'166 A de minimis rule
exempts retailers from the notice requirement if their total gross sales in
Oklahoma in the prior year and their reasonably expected gross sales in
Oklahoma in the current year are less than $100,000.167 Retailers subject
to the new notice requirement are required to provide a notice with every
sale to Oklahoma purchasers.1 68 The notice must include the following
information:
(A) The non-collecting retailer is not required, and does
not collect Oklahoma sales or use tax;
(B) The purchase is subject to Oklahoma use tax unless it
is specifically exempt from taxation;
(C) The purchase is not exempt merely because it is made
over the Internet, by catalog, or by other remote means;
(D) The State of Oklahoma requires Oklahoma purchasers
to report all purchases that were not taxed and pay tax on those
purchases. The tax may be reported and paid on the Oklahoma
individual income tax return [Form 511] or by filing a consumer
use tax return. [Form 21-1]; and
(E) The referenced forms and corresponding instructions
are available on the Oklahoma Tax Commission website, www.
tax.ok.gov.
169
The notice is required to be provided on "a page necessary to facilitate
the applicable transaction" or on the order form for catalog sales.17° The
notice must also be provided on the invoice for any Internet sale and
on the "purchase order, bill, receipt, sales slip, order form, or packaging
statement." 171
As noted above, the Oklahoma law does not require a customer
information report or annual purchase summary. It also does not include
any penalty provisions. As a result, the enactment of this law does not put
165 Act of June 9, 2010, ch. 412, 2010 Okla. Sess. Laws 1692 (West).
i66 OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 71o:65-2i-8(a)(3) (2o1i1).
167 Id. § 71o:65-21-8(a)(2).
i68 Id. § 71o:65-2i-8(b).
169 Id. § 7o:65-2i-8(b)(i).
170 Id. § 71o:65-2I-8(b)(2).
171 Id. § 71o:65-2i-8(b)(3).
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the same stress on the constitutional protections afforded to taxpayers
under Quill as does the Colorado Act. However, another provision of the
Oklahoma Act more than compensates for the relative timidity of that
limited reporting law.
In addition to creating the transactional-notice requirement, the
Oklahoma Act created a new statutory section that is nothing short of a
direct rejection of Quill. That section contains no operative provisions, but
lists a series of bold declarations. Those declarations are as follows:
A. It is hereby declared to be the intent of the Oklahoma
Legislature to specifically include within the use tax levied
by this article all storage, use or other consumption of tangible
personal property purchased or brought into this state through
the continuous, regular or systematic solicitation in the
Oklahoma consumer market by out-of-state retailers through
the Internet, mail order and catalog publications.
B. The Oklahoma Legislature finds that out-of-state
retailers purposefully direct their activities through the Internet
and other media at Oklahoma residents, that the magnitude of
.those contacts are more than sufficient for due process purposes,
and that the use tax is related to the benefits the out-of-state
retailers receive from access to the state....
C. The Oklahoma Legislature finds that the sales and use
tax system established under Oklahoma law does not pose an
undue burden on out-of-state retailers and provides sufficient
simplification to warrant the collection and remittance of use
taxes by out-of-state retailers that are due and owing to the State
of Oklahoma and its local jurisdictions.17 1
The totality of these declarations amounts to a unilateral determination
by the Oklahoma legislature that the imposition of Oklahoma's sales and
use tax against remote vendors would not violate the Commerce Clause.
This determination is apparently based on a belief that Quill's bright-
line test was principally motivated by the burdens imposed on multistate
taxpayers by the multitude of sales-and-use-tax rules and regulations across
the nation and the belief that such burdens are sufficiently mitigated by
Oklahoma's adherence to the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement
("SSUTA"). The scope and impact of the SSUTA is discussed briefly below
in Section C.1.
3. South Dakota and Vermont Legislation.-South Dakota and Vermont
enacted Oklahoma style tax-reporting statutes in 2011.173 Each statute
172 OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 14 o7.5(A)-(C) (Supp. 20io). The statutory provision then lists
the various ways that Oklahoma has simplified its sales and use tax provisions. Id. § 1407.5(C)
(0)-07).
173 Act of March Io, 2oi i, ch. 59, 2011 S.D. Sess. Laws I59; Act of May 24, 2o1, Pub.
L. No. 45, 2011 Vt. Acts & Resolves 169. Vermont's enactment was particularly interesting
because the legislature simultaneously adopted a nexus provision like those discussed supra
note 124. However, that nexus provision does not take effect until fifteen states have adopted
similar laws. See § 37(03), 2011 Vt. Acts & Resolves at 188. At the time that the nexus provision
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effectively mirrors the Oklahoma law by requiring only a transactional notice
that contains the same types of information as required in Oklahoma.174
The notices are required of all retailers that are not required to collect
South Dakota or Vermont sales and use tax, that do not voluntarily register
to do so, and that "makes sales of tangible personal property, services,
and products transferred electronically from a place of business outside
[South Dakota or Vermont] for use, storage, or consumption."'75 Another
key similarity is the lack of any penalty for non-compliance. Indeed, both
the South Dakota and Vermont legislation explicitly provide that "[n]o
criminal penalty or civil liability may be applied or assessed for failure to
comply.. ." with their provisions.176
C. Intergovernmental Actions Related to the Physical-Presence
Requirement For Sales and Use Tax
States do not act in isolation when developing their tax systems or
lobbying Congress for favorable legislation. Rather, states have created
organizations dedicated to uniformity, information sharing, and coordinated
lobbying efforts.Actions taken by two such groups-the Streamlined Sales
and Use Tax Governing Board and the Multistate Tax Commission-are
of particular relevance to the current debate regarding Quill. Those actions
are discussed below.
1. Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement.-The SSUTA was born from
multiple efforts to simplify and coordinate state sales and use taxation.177
It ultimately was created through the actions of the Streamlined Sales Tax
Project ("SSTP") in the early 2000s and is overseen by the Streamlined
Sales and Use Tax Governing Board.178 The SSUTA has evolved over the
years and is currently a 198-page agreement intended to "simplify and
modernize sales and use tax administration in the member states in order
is applicable, the use-tax reporting requirements will be repealed. Id. § 37(14).
174 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 9783(C) (201 I); Act of March 10, 2011, ch. 59, § 2, 2011 S.D.
Sess. Laws 159, 159.
175 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 9783(a)(2)(201 i);Act of March 10, 201, ch. 59, §§ I(3), 2,2011
S.D. Sess. Laws 159, 159.
176 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 9783(d)(6) (zo 1); Act of March 10, 2011, ch. 59, § 9, 2011 S.D.
Sess. Laws 159, 161. Given the extreme similarity of the South Dakota and Vermont provi-
sions to the Oklahoma provision, further discussion of those laws is unnecessary for purposes
of this Article.
177 See HELLERSTEIN, supra note 16,'1 19A.oI[i].
178 Id. 19A.02[41. For a complete discussion of the history of the SSTP, see id. '
19A.02; see also WALTER HELLERSTEIN & JOHN A. SWAIN, STREAMLINED SALES AND USE TAX, ch.
2 (2oo8-2oo9 ed. 2oo9); John A. Swain, State Sales and Use Tax Jurisdiction: An Economic Nexus
Standard for the Tweny-First Century, 38 GA. L. REV. 343, 371-72 (2003).
[Vol. IOO
FADING BRIGHT PHYSICAL PRESENCE
to substantially reduce the burden of tax compliance."' 17 9 To that end,
the SSUTA provides model rules for a range of sales and use tax matters
including administrative matters, tax bases, definitions, sourcing rules,
exemptions, returns, and remittances."" Importantly, the SSUTA does
not create a standardized legislative template to which all member states
adhere. Member states are free, for example, to determine their tax bases
and exemptions. I"1 Currently, twenty-four states have been admitted as
members of the SSUTA and have passed legislation conforming to, at least
in substantial part, the SSUTA. 182
The most notable aspect of the SSUTA for purposes of this Article is
the impact that certain parties believe that it has on Quill. As noted above,
footnote six of Quill identified the lack of uniformity that existed in state
and local sales and use taxation as support for the idea that taxation of
parties without a physical presence in a state could unduly burden
interstate commerce. The SSUTA directly addresses that concern by
creating uniformity in key administrative areas. It also may undercut the
Court's stare decisis rationale by changing the legal landscape since Quill."3
It is not surprising, then, that the SSUTA is cited as support for directly
overturning Quill in court.s In late-2010, the Streamlined Sales Tax
Governing Board joined this crowd, announcing that it was studying the
option of overturning Quill directly through litigation."
179 STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., STREAMLINED SALES AND USE TAX AGREE-
MENT § 102 (zoO), available at http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/uploads/downloads/
Archive/SSUTA/SSUTA%zoAs%zoAmended%20213_lo.pdf [hereinafter STREAMLINED
SALES AND USE TAX AGREEMENT]. A full discussion of the SSUTA is beyond the scope of this
Article. For more information on the SSUTA, see the authorities cited supra note 167.
I8o STREAMLINED SALES AND USE TAX AGREEMENT § 102.
181 Id. § 103. For a more detailed discussion of the level of uniformity required by the
SSUTA, see HELLERSTEIN & SWAIN, supra note 177, at ch. 3; Swain, supra note 177, at 372-79.
182 Frequently Asked Questions, STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., http://www.
streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?page=faqs (last visited Nov. 5, 20 1 ) [hereinafter Frequent-
ly Asked Questions]. Those states include Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Vir-
ginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Id.
183 Swain, supra note 177, at 383 ("As a constitutional matter, SSUTA removes the stare
decisis underpinnings of Quill by changing the underlying legal and factual environment..
184 See id. at 382-83; see also Robert D. Plattner, Daniel Smirlock & Mary Ellen La-
douceur, A New Way Forward for Remote Vendor Sales Tax Collection, 55 STATE TAX NOTES 187,
187-97 (2009).
I85 John Buhl, Governing Board Studying Option of Overturning Quill, 58 STATE TAX NOTES
386, 386-88 (2010).
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2. Multistate Tax Commission Model Information-Reporting Statute.-The
Multistate Tax Commission (the "MTC") is "an intergovernmental
state tax agency working on behalf of states and taxpayers to administer,
equitably and efficiently, tax laws that apply to multistate and multinational
enterprises." ' 6 The MTC focuses its efforts on:
Facilitating the pro'per determination of State and local tax liability
of multistate taxpayers, including the equitable apportionment
of tax bases and settlement of apportionment disputes;
Promoting uniformity or compatibility in significant components
of tax systems;
Facilitating taxpayer convenience and compliance in the filing of
tax returns and in other phases of tax administration; [and]
Avoiding duplicative taxation."S7
The MTC focuses much of its effort on the creation of model legislation
for consideration by its compact members. Following the enactment of
the Colorado Act, the MTC committed to work on a model statute in
the same vein.188 This model statute is framed after the Colorado Act and
thus includes a transactional notice, an annual information return, and a
customer information report.8 9 It also provides penalty, administrative,
and confidentiality provisions." The MTC is currently working on this
model legislation and sent a draft to its member states for review in June
2011.191 In December, 2011, the Executive Committee of the MTC sent
the draft back to the Sales and Use Tax Uniformity Subcommittee to
provide a specific de minimis threshold, and the subcommittee is currently
undertaking that task. 1 The MTC model legislation, regardless of how its
details are determined, will appear to suffer the same fate as the Colorado
Act. The two are so structurally intertwined that the Commerce Clause
186 About the Multistate Tax Commission, MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION, http://www.mtc.
gov/About.aspx?id=4o (last visited Nov. 5, 2011).
187 Id.
I88 John Buhl, MTC Panel to Draft 'Amazon' Law ModelLegislation, 55 STATE TAX NOTES
678,678-79 (2010).
189 MODEL SALES & USE TAX NOTICE AND REPORTING ACT § (c) (Tentative Draft 2011),
available at http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/Multistate_Tax_Commission/Uniformity/
UniformityCommittee-andSubcommittees/201 IWinterCommitteeMeeting/UTR%20
UC%2oMemo%2o2-18-I i.pdf.
I9o Id. § (a), (d)-(h).
191 Amy Hamilton, Wal-Mart Supports MTC Draft Model 'Amazon' Statute, 60 STATE TAX
NOTES 770 (2010i).
192 Amy Hamilton, MTC Advances Draft on Tax Collection by Hotels and Online Travel Com-
panies, 62 STATE TAX NOTES 719, 719-20 (2o 1); Amy Hamilton, MTC Panels Tweak Colorado-
Style 'Amazon' Draft Statute, UDITPA Amendments, 63 STATE TAX NOTES 439, 439-40 (201z)
(explaining that the subcommittee held a January 31, 2012 meeting in which it appeared to
prefer a recommendation that the model statute include a small-seller exception that would
apply to retailers with less than $200,000 of gross sales and another exception that would apply
to retailers with less than $ioo,ooo of gross in-state deliveries.)
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concerns under the Colorado Act will apply equally to the MTC's model
act.
III. KFC COoRATmON v. IowA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE
The discussion above evidences the pressure that the Quill physical-
presence test has faced in recent years. States have attempted various
methods to obtain reprieve from the limitations imposed by that test,
including rejecting the test outright outside of sales and use taxes,
expanding their attributional-nexus provisions, and imposing extensive
information-reporting requirements on vendors who do not voluntarily
collect the states' taxes. Ultimately, however, none of those efforts provide
states with the full power that they desire to require out-of-state retailers
to collect their use taxes. Quill still provides a bright-line test limiting state
action in that area.
States wanting to expand their authority without directly challenging
Quill must therefore find ways of extending its boundaries within a
physical-presence framework. Such a method may have been introduced
by the Iowa Supreme Court in KFC Corp. v. Iowa Department of Revenue."3
That decision appears to significantly diminish the impact of Quill, without
expressly holding that it is no longer valid law. KFC thus could represent
the opening for which states have been looking to expand their reach
without requiring a direct challenge to Supreme Court precedent.
A. Background
KFC Corporation is incorporated in Delaware and maintains its
headquarters in Louisville, Kentucky.194 Its principal business is the
ownership and licensing of intellectual property related to its restaurant
business and business method.95  KFC operates company-owned
restaurants, but also licenses its trademarks and business system to
independent, unrelated franchisees for their use in daily operations.
19
In exchange for those rights, franchisees pay KFC royalties based upon a
percentage of their gross revenues each month.19
On October 19, 2001, the Iowa Department of Revenue issued an
assessment to KFC for unpaid corporate income taxes, penalties, and
193 KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 792 N.W.zd 308 (Iowa 2010).
194 Id. at 310.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 31 ;see also FAQ's: QSR Restaurant: Kentucky Fried Chicken Franchise, KFCFRAN-
CHISE.XOM, http://www.kfcfranchise.com/faqs-qsr-restaurant.php (last visited July 2, 201 1) (in-
dicating that franchisees pay an initial franchise fee of $45,000, a monthly royalty fee of5% of
gross sales, and a monthly advertising fee of 5% of gross sales).
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interest for the years 1997, 1998, and 1999.1" During that period, KFC
had franchisees, but no company-owned stores or employees, in the
state.' KFC challenged the Department's assessment as a violation of the
Commerce Clause through an administrative hearing process and before
an Iowa district court without success."' KFC appealed the district court's
ruling to the Iowa Supreme Court, which issued its ruling on December
30, 20 10.201
B. IowA SUPREME COURT PROCEEDINGS
KFC's principal argument to the Iowa Supreme Court was that
the physical-presence standard of Quill barred the state's income-tax
assessment.202 KFC argued that the Supreme Court had never before
upheld an imposition of state income tax on a party without a physical
presence in the taxing state. 0 3 The Department countered by arguing that
Quill was inapplicable to state income taxes and thus had no application
in the case at hand.204 The Department's arguments mirrored those made
by other state taxing authorities in the Geoffrey line of cases discussed
above. 05 The Department argued that those cases evidenced that "[t]he
overwhelming weight of authority" supported its assessment.10
6
The Iowa Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision upholding the
assessment of tax against KFC on the last day of its 2010 term.0 7 The court
198 KFC, 792 N.W.zd at3IO.
199 Id.
2oo Id. at3l1-12.
201 Id. at3o8.
202 Brief of Appellant and Request for Oral Argument at 13-24, KFC Corp., 792 N.W.2d
3o8 (No . o 9 -1o3 2). KFC also raised state law claims in opposition of the assessment. See id. at
25-42. Those claims are beyond the scope of this Article and are not discussed herein.
203 Id. at 15 ("The United States Supreme Court has never sanctioned the imposition
of a state tax against a corporation based on its alleged 'economic nexus' with the state.").
204 Brief of Appellee and Notice of Oral Argument at 12, KFC Corp., 792 N.W.zd 3o8
(No. 09-1032).
205 Id. at 13-28.
2o6 Id. at I2.
207 The decision was handed down as a unanimous decision, although Justice Wiggins
concurred only with the result. KFC Corp., 792 N.W.2d at 330. The timing of the court's
decision was notable given the historic removal of three of the justices following a conten-
tious retention election in November 20O0. The justices were subject to vigorous negative
campaigning after the court's decision in Varnuam v. Bien, 763 N.W.zd 862 (Iowa 2009), which
struck down a state restriction on same-sex marriages as a violation of the equal protection
clause of the Iowa Constitution. Id. at 872. The removal of the justices was effective on Janu-
ary 1, 2011, but December 30 was the justices' last day on the court given the New Year's Eve
holiday that closed the court on December 31. See Grant Schulte, Iowans Dismiss Three Justices,
DES MoINEs REGISTER, Nov. 3, 20o0, at Ai, available at http://www.desmoinesregister.com/
article/zolo103/NEWSo 9 /1i O3O39olowans-dismiss-three-justices (reporting the historic
[Vol. l0o
2011-.20]21 FADING BRIGHT PHYSICAL PRESENCE
began with a historical analysis of the Court's restrictions on state taxation
under the Commerce Clause, focusing on the genesis of the Court's
physical-presence test.2 08 The court then looked at how the Supreme
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence had been applied by state courts in
cases involving state income taxes.2 09 The KFC court recognized that certain
courts had extended Quill beyond sales and use taxation, but determined
that "the weight of state authority" was against that extension.10
Having completed its review of the relevant case law, the court began
its analysis of the case by first evaluating whether Quill's physical presence
test was met by KFC. 1 ' That analysis was surprising given the lack of
any argument in either of the parties' briefs or oral arguments regarding
whether KFC had a physical-presence in the state. The issue addressed by
the parties was simply whether the physical-presence test applied to the
state's income tax. It is thus unclear why the court addressed this issue, but
its analysis cannot be ignored.
The KFC court commenced its Quill analysis by noting that KFC's
facts differed from those presented in Quill because KFC was not a mail-
order retailer but rather licensed intangible property to parties within the
state and derived royalty income therefrom."' 2 The court contrasted KFC's
"presence" in Iowa (the use of its intangible property in the state) with
Quill's minimal physical presence in North Dakota (presented by title to
a few floppy diskettes) and viewed KFC's licensing agreements as a "far
greater involvement" within Iowa because its intellectual property was
election in Iowa).
2o8 KFC, 792 N.W.zd at 312-20.
209 Id. at 320-22.
z2o Id. at 322. The court concluded its historical review by recognizing that the author-
ity supporting a limitation of Quill was not necessarily indicative of the ultimate views of the
United States Supreme Court, noting that "it might be argued that state supreme courts are
inherently more sympathetic to robust taxing powers of states than is the United States Su-
preme Court." Id. Despite this nod to skeptical taxpayers and tax practitioners, the court did
not let this factor influence its adoption of the economic-nexus concept for purposes of Iowa
income taxation.
211 Id. at 323. Before embarking on this analysis, the court noted that its "task" in the
case was:
to determine, to the best of our ability, how the United States Supreme Court
would decide this case under its case law and established dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine. In performing this task ... we do not seek to improve or clarify
Supreme Court doctrine. We simply do our best to predict how the Supreme Court
would decide the issues presented in this case.
Id. This comment becomes especially puzzling as one analyzes the court's discussion and
holding with respect to whether KFC had a physical presence in Iowa under Quill. The court's
holding on this issue certainly did not fall within existing Supreme Court precedent and can
be seen only (in its most favorable light) as "improving or clarifying" Supreme Court doctrine.
212 Id.
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used within Iowa to produce income. 13
Having made this factual determination, the court next looked at pre-
Quillcase law that established that the use of intangible property in a state
could support the imposition of ad valorem and income taxes where that
intangible property had established a business situs in the taxing state."1 4
The court also looked at a secondary line of pre-Quill cases that supported
the notion that the receipt of income from transactions within a state
provided a sufficient nexus with that state under the Commerce Clause. 15
Without further explanation, the court concluded its Quill analysis by
holding that:
[T]he Supreme Court would likely find intangibles owned by
KFC, but utilized in a fast-food business by its franchisees that
are firmly anchored within the state, would be regarded as having
a sufficient connection to Iowa to amount to the functional
equivalent of 'physical presence' under Quill. Furthermore, the
fact that the transactions that produced the revenue were based
upon use of intangibles in Iowa also provides a sufficient basis to
support the tax under the Commerce Clause.1
16
This holding purported to be an application of Quill, but the court's
language and analysis leads to confusion regarding what the holding
actually represents. The court's citation to, and discussion of, pre-Quill
cases outside of the context of sales and use taxes are not instructive on the
physical-presence test. Further, the court's secondary focus on KFC's mere
derivation of revenue from transactions within the state is simply irrelevant
in a physical-presence analysis. The generation of revenue from a state
can be achieved wholly independent of a taxpayer's physical presence
in that state. Based on these factors, one could infer that the court was
really driving towards a determination that a physical-presence was simply
not required for the state income tax assessment at issue. However, the
court clearly was not intending to do so. The court offered this analysis in
a section of its opinion that it labeled an "[a]pplication of Quill."' 7 Further,
the court referenced the physical-presence test in its holding. The court
thus certainly intended its analysis to be an application of the physical-
213 Id.
214 Id. (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 445-46 (198o) (allow-
ing the apportionment of income from intangible property); N.Y. ex rel. Whitney v. Graves,
299 U.S. 366 (1937) (upholding an assessment based upon the income earned from selling an
intangible right to a seat on the New York Stock Exchange); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298
U.S. 193 (1936) (holding that intangible property can acquire a business situs in a state other
than the corporation's state of domicile)). For a full discussion of these cases, see infra text ac-
companying notes 228-41.
215 KFC, 792 N.W.2d at 323-24 (citing Int'l Harvester Co. v. Wis. Dep't of Taxation, 322
U.S. 435 (944); Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939); Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920)).
216 Id. at324.
217 Id. at323.
[Vol. 100
2011-2012] FADING BRIGHT PHYSICAL PRESENCE
presence rule.
This conclusion is confirmed by the next section of the court's decision,
which analyzes whether the physical-presence requirement even applied
to the state's income tax. 18 That section starts by explicitly setting up
its analysis as an "alternative" holding. 19 The court's initial holding thus
represents an explicit determination that KFC had, in fact, met Quills
physical-presence test. This holding is a new and expansive application of
that test and is discussed in great detail in Section IV, below.
The court's secondary analysis of whether the physical-presence test
even applied to Iowa's income tax repeated the litany of reasons cited by
other state courts in rejecting the application of Quill to their state income
taxes."' 0 The KFC court followed that "weight of authority" and limited the
scope and purpose of Quill to nothing more than a begrudging nod to stare
decisis.22 ' The court held that:
[A] physical presence is not required under the dormant
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution in order
for the Iowa legislature to impose an income tax on revenue
earned by an out-of-state corporation arising from the use of its
intangibles by franchisees located within the State of Iowa. We
hold that, by licensing franchises within Iowa, KFC has received
the benefit of an orderly society within the state and, as a result,
is subject to the payment of income taxes that otherwise meet
the requirements of the dormant [sic] Commerce Clause.z
22
The court's rejection of a physical-presence standard for purposes of
the state's income tax thus falls in line with the current weight of state
authority.
2 3
218 Id. at 324-28.
219 The court stated that "[iun the alternative, even if the use of intangibles within the
state in a franchised business does not amount to 'physical presence' under Quill, the question
arises whether the Supreme Court would extend the Quill 'physical presence' requirement"
to state income taxes." Id. at 324.
220 Id. at 324-28. Interestingly, the court also referred to the potential for tax evasion
that the physical-presence test "engenders." Id. 327-28. This comment evidences the taint
that the intangible-holding-company cases have had on the evolution of the economic-nexus
doctrine.
z21 Id. ("The lynchpin of the Supreme Court's opinion in Quill was not logic, or the
developing Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but stare decisis.").
222 Id. at 328 (emphasis omitted). The court went on to analyze certain state law claims
that had been offered by KFC, but held against KFC on those points as well. Id. at 328-29.
223 On April 28, 201 1, KFC petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari
to the Iowa Supreme Court. That petition was denied on October 3, 2011. KFC Corp. v. Iowa
Dep't of Revenue, 132 S. Ct. 97 (2oi). Interestingly, however, the question presented by
KFC was "[wihether the decision of the Iowa Supreme Court, in acknowledged conflict with
the decisions of other state courts, violates the Commerce Clause by holding that a State may
tax the income of an out-of-state business that maintains no physical presence in the taxing
State." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, KFC Corp., 132 S. Ct. 97 (No. 10-1340), 201 WL
1633948 at *i. Thus, KFC did not ask the court to address the Iowa court's physical-presence
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IV. EVALUATING KFC'S NEW WORLD OF PHYSICAL PRESENCE
The KFC court's Quill analysis was surprising and certainly unique.
Courts evaluating earlier economic-nexus cases did not even consider
whether the taxpayers in those cases met the physical-presence test, but
simply determined that the test did not apply. KFC thus stands on its
own as an apparent expansion of state power. Its scope and validity must
therefore be evaluated. As discussed above, states have been searching for
the method to finally relax (or dispense with) Quill, and the KFC court's
analysis could provide one possible path for doing so.
Whether KFC provides that path depends on the validity of the two
lines of reasoning thatthe court relied upon in its physical-presence analysis:
(1) that KFC's licensing of intellectual property to its Iowa franchisees
had created the functional equivalency of a physical presence in the state;
and (2) that KFC's derivation of revenue from transactions in the state
was sufficient to justify the imposition of tax under Quill."2 4 The court's
functional-equivalency analysis is a unique extension of Quill's physical-
presence test and is worthy of discussion. However, the second rationale
given by the Iowa Supreme Court can be dispensed with much more
quickly. The court's determination that physical presence nexus could be
established based simply on the generation of income from transactions
occurring in the taxing state is indefensible. 22I That reasoning is simply
economic nexus by another name. Reliance on that reasoning would
therefore effectively repeal Quill and the court should have presented it as
such. The remainder of this Article thus focuses on the court's functional-
equivalency ruling and evaluates whether it stands as a possible avenue
for extending state power while adhering to Quill, or whether it too is an
effective repeal of the physical-presence test.
A. The Origin of the Functional-Equivalency Test
The KFC court's physical-presence analysis began with a discussion
of the scope of KFC's market presence in Iowa. The court felt that the
"nexus presented by the use of KFC's intangible property within the State
of Iowa," was "far more than title to a few floppy diskettes" ' 6 and that
KFC's licensing agreements were a "far greater involvement" within Iowa
holding.
224 See supra text accompanying notes 2 13-15.
225 The court's analysis also ignores that the transactions generating revenue for KFC
were the licensing agreements entered into between KFC and its franchisees outside of the
state. The transactions that occurred in Iowa (KFC franchisees' sales of product to customers)
merely determined the magnitude of the income under the out-of-state transactions. One can
argue the impact of this distinction, but it should be addressed nonetheless.
226 KFC, 792 N.W.zd at 323.
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than Quill's involvement in North Dakota."2 7 Based on that presence, the
court determined that "the Supreme Court would likely find intangibles
owned by KFC, but utilized in a fast-food business by its franchisees
that are firmly anchored within the state, would be regarded as having
a sufficient connection to Iowa to amount to the functional equivalent of
'physical presence' under Quill."' 8
The KFC court did not offer any insight into the source of, or support
for, its functional-equivalency test. The court merely cited a string of pre-
Quill cases-Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, Whitney v. Graves, and Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Commissioner of Tax-in support of its decision.2 9 These citations
are curious, however, because none of those cases involved sales or use
taxes, or discussed a functional-equivalency concept.
Wheeling Steel involved an ad valorem tax levied by the state of West
Virginia on a taxpayer's property in the state, including certain accounts
receivable and bank deposits. 3 The taxpayer was a Delaware corporation,
but maintained its general business offices in West Virginia. The taxpayer
argued that the imposition of tax on the value of its accounts receivable and
bank deposits violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.31 The crux of the case was whether the taxpayer's
accounts receivable and bank deposits had obtained a business situs in
West Virginia. 3 The Supreme Court analyzed the taxpayer's business
activities carried on inside and outside of West Virginia, determined that
the assets were properly attributable to West Virginia, and determined that
the taxation of the intangible property by West Virginia violated neither
the Due Process Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause. 3 3 The Court
did not discuss either a physical-presence requirement or a functional-
equivalency doctrine. Indeed, the taxpayer's operations were based in the
227 Id. As discussed above, the KFC court also initially explained that KFCs facts dif-
fered from those presented in Quill because KFC was not a mail-order retailer but rather
licensed intangible property to parties within the state and derived royalty income therefrom.
Id. at 323. One could infer that the court was attempting to lay the groundwork for Professor
Hellerstein's argument that Quill's physical-presence test may be limited to the mail order
industry. See supra note 87. This argument certainly seems supported by the court's analysis,
which focused on factors other than physical presence. KFC, 792 N.W.2d at 323-24. The court
ultimately undercut this argument, however, by referring back to the physical-presence test in
its holding. Id. at 324. Thus, it does not appear that the KFC court meant to suggest that Quill
applied only to mail-order vendors.
228 KFC, 79a N.W.2d at 324 (emphasis added).
229 Id. at 323.
230 Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 200 (1936).
231 Id.
232 Id. at 210-1I ("In the instant case, both parties recognize the principle and the ex-
ception. It is appellant's contention that the state creating a corporation has the sole right to
tax its intangible property 'unless such intangible property has acquired a 'business situs'
elsewhere."').
233 Id.at21-16.
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taxing state so it clearly had a physical presence there. The issue in the case
was the proper situs for intangible assets for property-tax purposes, not any
jurisdictional bar on the imposition of tax against the taxpayer before the
court.
Whitney was factually much more similar to KFC than was Wheeling
Steel, but is similarly non-instructive on the physical-presence test. Whitney
involved a due process challenge to the imposition of New York income
tax on gains from the sale of a fractional membership on the New York
Stock Exchange by an out-of-state taxpayer." Whitney was a resident
of Massachusetts who did business in Boston. Whitney's membership on
the Exchange gave him rights to trade on the Exchange and access to
certain other benefits, including an insurance fund and access to reduced
commissions for transactions undertaken on his behalf.
2 35
Whitney challenged the imposition of New York income tax on his gains
from the sale of his fractional membership, arguing that the membership did
not have a business situs in New York. 36 The Supreme Court evaluated the
rights to which Whitney's membership entitled him and determined that
the very nature of the asset was that it was "localized" at the exchange. 37
The Court noted that, wherever the owner of such a membership right
resides, "he must go to the Exchange to exercise his privilege to trade
upon its floor. '238 The Court held that "the dominant attribute of relator's
membership in the New York Stock Exchange so links it to the situs of
the Exchange as to localize it at that place and hence to bring it within the
taxing power of New York."' 39
The Whitney court made no attempt to analyze Whitney's physical
presence in New York. Rather, the Court evaluated the business situs of
Whitney's property for purposes of a challenge under the Due Process
Clause. This case is thus of no utility to an analysis under Quill.
234 N.Y. ex rel. Whitney v. Graves, 299 U.S. 366,369-70 (1937).
235 Id. at 370-71.
236 Id. at371-72.
237 Id. at 374.
238 Id. at 373.
239 Id. at 374.
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The third and final case cited by the KFC court in its functional-
equivalency analysis was Mobil Oil. That case involved a corporate income
tax imposed by the state of Vermont on apportioned income that included
certain foreign-source dividends."4 The taxpayer resisted the inclusion of
those dividends in its apportionable income on three grounds: (1) that the
dividends had no nexus to the taxing state; (2) that such inclusion would
create an unconstitutional burden of multiple taxation; and (3) that the
foreign source of the dividend payments precluded taxation because of
the risk of multiple taxation on an international level. 41 None of these
arguments rested on a physical-presence analysis. Mobil admittedly had a
physical presence in the taxing state.
The only relevance that Mobil Oil has to the KFC court's physical-
presence analysis is its brief business-situs discussion. As part of its
multiple-taxation argument, Mobil argued that the Court's business-situs
cases indicated that its state of commercial domicile (New York) had the
right to tax its dividend income without apportionment and that, as a result,
Vermont was prohibited from taxing that income. 4 The Court responded
to this argument by distinguishing its property tax cases (which allowed
allocation of intangibles to a single situs) from cases involving income
taxes (which allowed the apportionment of income from intangibles).
43
The Court thus rejected the taxpayer's Commerce Clause challenge.
Most notably, however, the Court did not discuss the taxpayer's physical
presence in the taxing state.
A brief review of the three cases cited by the KFC court in its functional-
equivalency analysis quickly evidences their lack of relevancy to the
functional-equivalency concept. It appears as though the court may have
cited these cases for their business-situs analyses, but those analyses are
simply irrelevant for purposes of a traditional physical-presence inquiry.
The functional-equivalency test is similarly not rooted in NationalBellas
Hess or Quill. Those cases established the physical-presence test as a bright-
line safe harbor. The Quill Court reiterated the necessity of the physical-
presence test by noting that "[s]uch a rule firmly establishes the boundaries
of legitimate state authority to impose a duty to collect sales and use taxes
240 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 425 (1980). The foreign-source
dividends included both dividends from organizations formed in the U.S. but operated abroad,
and organizations both formed and operated abroad. Id. at 435. The concept of "apportion-
able" income relates to the tax base for domestic corporations. See HELLERSTEIN, Supra note
16, ch. 8. Among the concepts relevant to determining a corporation's apportionable income is
the extent to which the income is earned from the conduct of a "unitary business." Id. 4 8.07.
241 Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 436.
242 Id. at 443-44.
243 Id. at 445 ("Although a fictionalized situs for intangible property sometimes has
been invoked to avoid multiple taxation of ownership, there is nothing talismanic about the
concepts of 'business situs' or 'commercial domicile' that automatically renders those con-
cepts applicable when taxation of income from intangibles is at issue.").
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and reduces litigation concerning those taxes .... Moreover, a bright-line
rule in the area of sales and use taxes also encourages settled expectations.
."44 Further, even in those cases, the Court rejected the limited physical
presence that common carriers and limited tangible property provided
in the taxing states. Neither Bellas.Hess nor Quill therefore supports the
concept of a functional-equivalency test.
4
The only apparent source for the court's test may be the New Mexico
Court of Appeals' decision in Kmart Properties, Inc. v. Taxation and Revenue
Department.2 46 That case is generally recognized for its adoption of the
economic-nexus test for purposes of the state's income tax, 47 but the case
also involved an analysis of the applicability of the state's gross receipts
tax to royalties received by an out-of-state intangible holding company
(KPI) that had no employees, operations, offices, or facilities located in the
state.
2 48
The New Mexico Court of Appeals' analysis of whether KPI had a
physical presence in the state under these circumstances was much more
robust than the Iowa Supreme Court's similar analysis in KFC. The Kmart
court focused its analysis on the relationship between KPI and Kmart and
evaluated Kmart's use of, and obligations with respect to, KPI's marks. The
court noted that KPI's marks were used for the "mutual benefit" of the
companies and that Kmart's use of those marks allowed Kmart "to facilitate
merchandise sales in New Mexico." 49 In that way, "Kmart employees,
wearing KPI's trademarks and working at stores with KPI's trademark on
the marquee, have acted to represent and promote the goodwill of KPI's
marks to the New Mexico consuming public."5 0 The court also looked
to the licensing agreements between Kmart and KPI, noting that such
agreements "further demonstrate[] that Kmart Corporation represented
KPI's goodwill in New Mexico by requiring Kmart employees, at least in
some form, to act on behalf of KPI's interests." '
The court's analysis responded to the New Mexico Taxation and
244 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298; 315-16 (1992).
245 The lack of authority or support for this test calls into question the KFC court's
statement that its task was not to "engage in independent constitutional adjudication" or
to "improve or clarify Supreme Court doctrine." KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 792
N.W.zd 308, 322 (Iowa 2oio).
246 Kmart Props., Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 131 P.3d 27 (N.M. Ct. App. 200),
rev'dsub nom, Kmart Corp. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 131 P3d 22 (N.M. 2005).
247 See supra text accompanying note 13.
248 Kmart Props., Inc., 131 P.3d at 36-41. Ultimately, the New Mexico Supreme Court
determined that the state could not impose its gross receipts tax on the intangible holding
company (KPI) for statutory reasons and overturned the Court of Appeals's determination on
this issue on that ground. KmartCorp., 131 P.3d at 25-27.
249 Kmart Props., Inc., 131 P.3 d at 37.
250 Id.
251 Id.
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Revenue Department's argument that KPI had a nexus in the state under
the authority of Tyler Pipe and Scripto. s2 The Department believed that
"Kmart Corporation used its stores and employees in New Mexico as local
representatives of KPI's goodwill ... to promote both its own sales and the
goodwill of KPI's marks." '53 This type of Tyler Pipe analysis was unique in
that it applied not to a retailer selling products in a state, but to an out-of-
tate entity that simply licensed intellectual property to in-state retailers.
That application of TylerPipe thus represented a significant expansion of its
doctrine. The court recognized this aspect of the Department's argument
and stated that the distinction between the types of businesses and nature
of the property interests being promoted did not require any different
result. s4 The Kmart court ultimately concluded that:
The case before us presents far more than just merchandise
bearing out-of-state trademarks for sale in New Mexico stores.
An extensive apparatus of Kmart stores, signs, and employees
are also physically present in New Mexico to work on behalf
of KPI's goodwill and associated interests. That apparatus
represents KPI's property interests in New Mexico, pursuant to
a licensing agreement that requires Kmart Corporation to act on
KPI's behalf.
Considering the Quill standard in the context of this case,
we conclude that the combination of Kmart Corporation's
activities in New Mexico, together with the tangible presence
of KPI's marks, constitutes the functional equivalent of physical
presence as afforded by the independent representatives in
Scripto and Tyler Pipe. s"
The New Mexico Court of Appeals' ruling thus enunciated a functional-
equivalency standard, but did so in the context of a Tyler Pipe analysis. In
this way the Kmart functional-equivalency test is similar only in name to
the KFC functional-equivalency test. The KFC court did not cite to Kmart,
TylerPipe, or Scripto in.its analysis, nor did it focus on the activities of KFC's
franchisees with respect to its marks. Given this silence, it is difficult to
propose that the KFC test was adopted based upon a Tyler Pipe analysis. 56
The preceding analysis undercuts the three potential sources of
authority for the KFCfunctional-equivalency test-the three cases cited by
the court, Quill itself, and Kmart. That test thus appears to have no source
252 Id. at 38.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 39 (emphasis added).
256 In its opposition brief to KFC's petition for a writ of certiorari, the State of Iowa did
raise an argument that rested on Kmai-like factors. The State argued that KFC had a physical
presence in Iowa by pointing to the quality-iassurance activities that were undertaken in Iowa
on KFC's behalf and the role that KFC's Iowa franchisees played in protecting KFC's trade-
marks that were utilized in the state. See Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 4-7, KFC Corp.
v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 132 S. Ct. 97 (2o I) (No. 10-1340), 2011 WL 2632403.
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in current authority and is either a new relaxation of the physical-presence
test or a thinly veiled rejection of the same."s7
B. The Scope of the Functional-Equivalency Test
In one sense, the KFC court's functional-equivalency doctrine could be
viewed as nothing more than an unnecessary and irrelevant deviation from
the court's ultimate economic-nexus holding. The court could be seen as
simply providing some meaningless analysis before turning to its decision's
true import-its rejection of Quill as applied to the Iowa income tax. This
interpretation is belied, however, by the structure and scope of the court's
decision. The court devoted an entire section of its opinion to evaluating
whether Quill's physical-presence test had been met by KFC. The court
also expressly indicated that its economic-nexus holding was an alternative
holding. 58 The court's functional-equivalency holding thus should not be
cast aside as mere curiosity. As discussed above, states have been looking
to limit the physical-presence test. If the functional-equivalency test is
valid,it could give states a method for doing so without waiting for a direct
rejection of Quill.59
Ultimately, the utility of the functional-equivalency test depends
heavily on its scope, something that the KFC court did not define. The
court's opinion focused solely on the use of KFC's property by its Iowa
257 It should be noted that the Geoffrey OKcourt hinted at a similar Kmart-like functional
equivalency test, but determined that it need not address the issue given its economic-nexus
holding. See Geoffrey, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 132 P.3d 632, 639 & n.8 (Okla. Civ. App.
2005).
258 KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 792 N.Wzd 308, 324 (Iowa 2010).
259 This discussion necessarily assumes that the functional-equivalency test is appli-
cable to state sales and use taxes. However, one can frame an argument that the functional-
equivalency test should not so apply, but should be limited to state income taxes. The KFC
court enunciated that test in the context of a state income tax assessment, and, given state
courts' bent towards limiting Quill to sales and use taxes based partly on similar rationale, it
would seem fitting to limit the functional-equivalency test to state income taxation. This
bifurcation of the physical-presence test would seem unusual, but would appear consistent
with the lower level of Commerce Clause protection apparently afforded to state income taxes
(assuming that states' assertions of the economic-nexus standard are ultimately ruled to be
constitutional exercises of their power). In this way, the functional-equivalency test could be
seen as nothing more than a secondary method of obtaining an economic-nexus standard for
state income taxation. "
The natural response to this limitation is to ponder what purpose the test would serve if
so limited. States already feel uninhibited by the physical-presence test for purposes of state
income taxation. A liberalization of that test for those purposes would thus seem to have no
purpose or effect. Additionally, there does not appear to be any inherent reason that the KFC
court's analysis should be limited to income taxation. The court was purporting to apply Quill's
test, which taxpayers have argued for years applies equally to state sales and use taxes and
income taxes. Based on these factors, it seems that the KFC functional-equivalency test. is
equally applicable to state sales and use taxes, and this Article proceeds on that assumption.
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licensees,"6 and the court's only citations to legal authority involved cases
discussing the "situsing" of intangible property.61 The court did not offer
any other insight into the source of its functional-equivalency test nor
did it rely upon settled Tyler Pipe principals. Given this silence, the only
clear application of the functional-equivalency test is to situations like
that presented by KFC-the licensing of intangible property to in-state
businesses for their use in daily retail business activities. Persons who
employ that business model should thus consider the impact that KFC
will have on their sales- and use-tax obligations in Iowa and in other states
that may adopt its reasoning. Outside of the facts presented in the KFC
case, however, what actions could constitute the functional equivalence of
physical presence?
The first natural limitation of the functional-equivalency test is the
business-situs rationale of the few cases that the court actually cited in its
decision. Under that reading, a physical presence based upon the functional-
equivalency test could only be found where an out-of-state party had some
intangible property that had obtained a business situs in the state. This
reading would be intellectually satisfying in that it has some grounding
in existing law. 6' At the same time, it leaves much to be desired. The
legal requirements for the establishment of a business situs for intangible
property are not defined so clearly as to provide an easily administrable
rule. More importantly, the KFC decision simply does not impose that
limitation. The KFC court merely held that the intangibles owned by KFC
were "firmly anchored" in Iowa and thus would be "regarded as having
a sufficient connection to Iowa to amount to the functional equivalent
of 'physical presence' under Quill.""6 Although this language parallels a
business-situs analysis, the court's holding certainly did not expressly
apply, nor was its result expressly conditioned on, such an analysis.
If the functional-equivalency test is not tethered to the business-
situs concept, what are its limits? Could it be extended to reach Internet
26o KFC, 792 N.W.2d at 323-24.
261 Id.
262 It could also be argued that for an intangible to acquire a business situs in a state,
there must be some other business activity in the state that can be attributed to the out-of-
state party. For example, it could be argued that KFC's intellectual property could not have
acquired a business situs in Iowa without their use by KFC's licensees in tangible form (i.e.,
logos on uniforms, signs, buckets, etc.). If this argument is accepted, it is difficult to imagine
a case where an intangible can acquire a business situs in a state where the taxpayer does
not have some other physical presence in the state. The quick response to this argument,
however, is that it is nothing more than a Kmart-style functional-equivalency argument. If
physical assets (employees or tangible property) are to be attributed to a remote vendor, then
the proper analysis is to be done with respect to those assets. Short of Tyler Pipe attributional
nexus for those assets, a physical presence should not simply be bootstrapped with a business
situs analysis for intangible property.
263 Id. at 324.
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retailers? On its face, the test appears to offer an avenue for doing just that.
Just as KFC's trademarks are used daily in its franchisees' locations, web
browsers in the state undoubtedly display the websites and trademarks of
Internet retailers like Amazon.com and, Overstock.com every day. Those
repeated in-state website visits would not create a business situs for such an
online vendor's intellectual property in the state,"6 but one couldargue that
the type of market presence established by those actions is the functional
equivalent of a Quill-era physical presence. That is, one could argue that
the Internet gives modern retailers access to remote markets that the
Quill court could have assumed was only possible through a true physical
presence. In this way, a retailer like Amazon.com could be considered to
have the functional equivalent of a physical presence in states across the
nation regardless of its true physical footprint. The functional-equivalency
test read this broadly thus would pull Internet retailers within states' grasps
without directly rejecting Quill.
This broad reading may appeal to state taxing authorities, but can the
KFC decision be extended that far? The KFC case certainly seems to open
the possibility for such a broad application of the functional-equivalency
264 The recognition of the establishment of a business situs for intangible property for
tax purposes goes back to a series of cases from the turn of the twentieth century involving
advalorem taxes. See Michael T Fatale, Geoffrey Sidesteps Quill: Constitutional Nexus, Intangible
Property and the State Taxation of Income, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 407, 438 0994); HELLERSTEIN,
supra note i6, 9.03[3]. Those initial cases upheld the taxation of taxpayers who were not
physically present in the taxing state but who held receivables attributable to businesses lo-
cated within the state. Fatale, supra at 439-40. The Court reaffirmed this idea in Wheeling Steel,
discussed above. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 213-14 (1936). The Wheeling Steel
court "recognize[d] the principle that choses in action may acquire a situs for taxation other
than at the domicile of their owner, if they have become integral parts of some local busi-
ness." Id. at 210 (quoting Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 28o U.S. 204, 213 0930)).
The Court extended this concept to state income taxes in Whitney. As noted above, that case
involved the imposition of New York income tax on the gain derived by an out-of-state indi-
vidual who sold a fractional membership in the New York Stock Exchange. New York ex rel.
Whitney v. Graves, 299 U.S. 366,369 (1937). The taxpayer argued that New York could not tax
him based solely on that interest, because it had a business situs in Massachusetts, where he
engaged in business. Id. at 37 1-72. The court disagreed, explaining that:
When we speak of a "business situs" of intangible property in the taxing State we
are indulging in a metaphor. We express the idea of localization by virtue of the
attributes of the intangible right in relation to the conduct of affairs at a particular
place. The right may grow out of the actual transactions of a localized business or
the right may be identified with a particular place because the exercise of the right
is fixed exclusively or dominantly at that place. In the latter ease the localization
for the purpose of transacting business may constitute a business situs quite as
clearly as the conduct of the business itself.
Id. at 372. Applying this concept, the Court had no trouble in holding that the situs of the
taxpayer's seat on the New York Stock Exchange was New York and upheld the New York tax.
Id. at 372-74. The application of these business situs rulings to the Internet retailing industry
would be a profound and inexplicable expansion upon that doctrine and is not discussed
herein as a reasonable application of those rules.
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test. Indeed, the court practically invites this result by diverging from a
truly physical physical-presence test. The boundaries of the KFC court's
functional-equivalency test are simply unclear and are thus prone to be
extended until otherwise limited by the Supreme Court. This of course
begs the question: Can KFC be construed as a valid extension of the
physical-presence test, or must it be viewed as a rejection of the same?
C. The Functional-Equivalency Test as a Repudiation of Quill
The discussion above evidences the potentially broad applications of
the KFC court's functional-equivalency test. Whether the test is limited
to a business-situs analysis or is extended to encompass other types of
market presences that are equivalent to a Quill-era physical presence, the
test establishes a new avenue for states looking to expand their use tax
enforcement powers. However broadly construed, the test's extension of
Quill beyond its traditional scope widens the boundaries of the physical-
presence test in ways not seen before. That very extension, however, serves
to erode the legitimacy of that test. By moving beyond the physical realm,
the test abandons the fundamental underpinnings of the physical-presence
standard.
The Court's physical-presence test is a bright-line rule that is marked
by a physical action-the actual physical presence of a taxpayer in the
taxing state . 65 The functional-equivalency test, if taken at its word, erases
that bright line. Even if intellectual property can obtain a business situs or
create a significant market presence in a state, it cannot physically manifest
itself. Intellectual property is inherently, and necessarily, intangible and
simply cannot be physically present in a state.2 6 Once the physical-
presence test is extended to something that can be met through the use of
intangible assets, the test is no more.
2 67
265 Of course, this physical presence can be established though the presence of a tax-
payer's independent contractors in the state. See Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 211
(1960); Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc., v. Wash. State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 250-51 (1987).
266 Indeed, the Supreme Court has already recognized this point, labeling intangibles
as "relationships" that are "not related to physical things." HELLERSTEIN, supra note "16, 1
19.02[8][d] (quoting Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 365-66 (1939)). In a sense, this is no
different than a corporation itself. A corporation, at some level, is nothing more than a grant
of power from a state. A corporation is incorporeal and has no independent physical presence.
One could thus question why attributing a physical presence based upon an intangible asset
like a trademark would be such a novel extension of the physical-presence rule. After all,
corporations are routinely accepted as having a physical presence.
This question simply obfuscates the issue. The legal right of incorporation does not
have a physical presence. A corporation, as a taxpayer, however, can obtain a physical presence
when it acts through physical means-its employees, property, or independent contractors.
The same cannot be said for an intangible asset.
267 Indeed, Professor Hellerstein refers to the KFC court's physical-presence holding
as "semantic nonsense" and labels the idea that intangible rights can create the functional
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The test also fails to comport with the underlying principles of the
Court's physical-presence jurisprudence. Nothing in the Court's decisions
regarding sale and use taxes would support this move beyond a truly
physical physical-presence test. The Quill Court adopted its bright-line rule
in part to provide ease of administration and to reduce confusion.168 The
Court viewed the test as providing a "clear rule" that firmly established
the "boundaries of legitimate state authority." '69 Nothing in this language
supports an amorphous extension of the physical-presence test to take
into account changed business or economic conditions. Such a reading
would directly undermine the Quill court's non-stare decisis purposes for its
decision. Thus, even if the Quill Court's ruling was based upon its notion of
the limited market presence that could be obtained without a true physical
presence, and even if the Internet has changed that economic reality,
expanding the physical-presence test beyond its roots would be contrary to
the Court's stated goals and purpose for that test.
This discussion leads one to the conclusion that the functional-
equivalency test can be viewed only as a direct repudiation of Quill.
Therefore, like the court's in-state-transaction rationale, the functional-
equivalency doctrine must be evaluated in that light. That test simply
cannot be valid as long as Quill stands.
Given this determination, the import of the KFCfunctional-equivalency
test is uncertain unless and until the Court opines on that test. Until that
time, the test will stand as a purportedly valid application of the physical-
presence rule, and states are unlikely to abandon this new opportunity to
expand their power. However, the test presents a quandary for state tax
authorities-it has utility only as long as Quill stands, but it cannot be
squared with that case. States hoping to utilize the functional-equivalency
test therefore must be prepared to explain how it can co-exist with Quill. On
the other side, taxpayers against whom a functional-equivalency argument
is raised must provide adequate counsel to the reviewing court regarding
the test's true consequence. State courts sympathetic to their states'
revenue plights may view the test as a method of paying lip service to Quill
while avoiding a direct disapproval of that case. Only time (or Supreme
Court intervention) will tell whether and how successful the functional-
equivalency test may be in extending state sales- and use-tax jurisdiction
beyond its traditional roots.
equivalent of a physical presence an "oxymoronic suggestion." HELLERSTEIN, supra note 16, 1
6. 11 [3][a][xviil. He offers the same unabashed critique of the Kmart decision. Id. ( I9.0218]l[d]
("All of this is nonsense, and irrelevant nonsense, to boot. It is nonsense because intangibles,
by definition, have no physical presence anywhere.").
268 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 314-16 (1992).
269 Id. at315.
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V. EPILOGUE: IN DEFENSE OF A DOCTRINE
The preceding discussion has evidenced the various pressures that
states have placed on Quill's physical-presence test in recent years.
Oklahoma's direct rejection of that test, coupled with the KFC court's
effective repudiation, signals a shift in the battle over Quill's continuing
validity from the income-tax realm into that test's heart-state sales and
use tax. These actions raise. a very simple question of Constitutional
law: Is Quill still good law? Although this Article is not directed towards
a full defense or condemnation of that case, some closing comments are
warranted.
From a simplistic standpoint, Quill certainly still stands. The Court
has offered no indication that it is interested in reviewing that decision,
and it seems content to rely on Congress to make any changes that it
deems warranted. However, it seems likely that one or more state revenue
authorities emboldened by the Court's denials of certiorari in several high-
profile income-tax cases will simply take North Dakota's approach after
National Bellas Hess and self-declare the death of the physical-presence
test. Oklahoma certainly has made the first move in this regard with its
legislative declaration of Quill's inapplicability. As a conceptual matter,
then, is there any reason to believe that Quill is no longer valid?
A. A Modern Critique of Quill
Professor John Swain has been at the forefront of the modern calls to
abandon Quill on both normative7 0 and positive 7' grounds. His positive
critique centers around three categories of analysis in Quill that he has
labeled the "Three Faces of Quill." ' These include ' the "Stare Decisis
Quill," the "Burdens Quill," and the "Disappearing Ink Quill."'73 Stare
Decisis Quill refers, of course, to the Court's reliance on stare decisis in
its ruling. Burdens Quill refers to the Court's focus on the burdens that
broadly applied sales and use taxes could have on interstate commerce.
Disappearing Ink Quill refers to the Court's recognition it was not yet ready
to repeal the physical-presence rule and that Congress was ultimately able
to alter the Court's result by exercising its affirmative power.over interstate
commerce.
Professor Swain notes significant degradation of each of these faces of
Quill.74 With respect to Stare Decisis Quill, he cautions that "Itihe Court
270 See Swain, supra note 177, at 351-55.
271 John A. Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, 45
WM. & MnA L. REV. 319,331-44 (2003).
272 Id. at 337-44.
273 Id. at 338-44.
274 See Swain, supra note 177, at 358-65.
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may have given too much weight to the pragmatic factors."2 5 He questions
whether the mail-order industry (and by extension the Internet retail
industry) really has a "reasonable reliance interest" on a result that places
it at an advantage to in-state competitors. 7 6 He also compares the benefits
that the rule provides to the "countervailing burdens" that it imposes on
state and local governments, particularly noting the assumed competitive
disadvantage that it creates for local merchafits, its reduction in state
tax revenues, and its impact on the "overall efficiency of the national
economy."'77
Professor Swain limits Burdens Quill to a concern about the compliance
burdens placed on low-volume sellers who have contacts with many
states.7 ' He thus indicates that uniformity efforts like the SSUTA could
obviate the physical-presence standard. 7 9 Indeed, he argues not only that
the SSUTA erodes the stare decisis rationale of Quill, but that it "remedies
Quils compliance burden concerning the only substantive legal leg of the
Quill decision.
2 80
Finally, Professor Swain notes that the passage of time, coupled with the
accelerated rate of change in society, "ha[ve] made geography and physical
presence irrelevant in ways that could not have been contemplated by
the Quill court."2 8' Disappearing Ink Quill then would counsel towards a
judicial reevaluation of the doctrine, which he labels simply as "a relic of
[a] bygone era." '
As to not leave the wrong impression, Professor Swain has indicated
that he believes that Congress, rather than the courts, should address these
issues. 83 However, his critique of Quillwould certainly be used by any state
leading the charge to overturn that case in a judicial forum.
B. Turning the Other Cheek
Professor Swain's assessment of Quill's ongoing relevance is well-taken,
275 Id. at 360.
276 Id.
277 Id.
278 Id. at 361-63 ("Though not clearly stated, the Court's burdens concern seems to be
that businesses with low volume contacts with multiple states may have costs of compliance
that are excessive in comparison to the amount of business done in those states and to the
taxes that would be collected.").
279 Id. at 363-64.
28o Id. at 383.
281 Id. at365.
282 Id. at 392.
283 Id. at 369-70 ("Regarding a frontal judicial assault on Quill, however, states might
be wise to withhold their hand, 'at least for now'...."); John A. Swain & Walter Hellerstein,
Town Fair Tire and the Silliness of the Physical Presence Rule for Use Tax Collection Nexus, 50 STATE
TAX NOTES 447,450-51 (2oo8).
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but is not without room for debate. The three faces of Quill may not always
be pretty, but in many ways, they have not changed in material fashion
s ince Quill was decided. Therefore, a response to the analysis offered above
is warranted.!84
1. Stare Decisis.-The Quill court's stare decisis rationale was undoubtedly
a major factor in its determination to uphold National Bellas Hess. Indeed,
the Court recognized that it might not have adopted the physical-presence
test if it were then being asked to do so for the first time."8 5 Professor Swain
critiques the Court's reliance on stare decisis in part by critiquing its focus
on pragmatic factors, questioning whether taxpayers' reliance on National
Bellas Hess is reasonable given the advantage that it gives to remote
vendors.aS6
Absent normative appeals, it is difficult to accept this critique as a
sufficient dismissal of the Court's stare decisis rationale. Justice Scalia's
concurrence in Quill is particularly instructive on this point. Justice
Scalia first addressed the stare decisis issue by noting that the Court has
"long recognized that the doctrine of stare decisis has 'special force' where
'Congress remains free to alter what we have done."' 87 Justice Scalia then
noted that the Court could not disregard reliance interests on NationalBellas
Hess merely by arguing that its protection for remote vendors had become
"unreasonable."2 88 Instead, he cautioned that the Court should not inflict
"economic hardship upon those who took [the Court] at [its] word" and
cautioned that taxpayers should not have to "anticipate [its] overrulings."
2 89
Justice Scalia's opinion was that "reliance upon a square, unabandoned
holding of the Supreme Court is always justifiable reliance."'2 90
Justice Scalia's point is more than fair. Businesses should not have the
burden of doing equity analyses when making determinations regarding
their tax duties. Apparent (or perceived) unfairness that results from a
Supreme Court decision is a concern for policy makers, not for taxpayers
wrestling with compliance burdens in a multitude of commercial areas. The
latter group (and their tax advisors) must rely on stated law, communicate
that law to administrative personnel, and proceed with the conduct of their
284 This analysis is particularly important at this juncture with states seeking to chal-
lenge Quill on positive grounds rather than waiting for reprieve from the Court or Congress.
285 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 3t 1(1992).
286 See, e.g., Swain, supra note 177, at 359-60.
287 Quill, 504 U.S. at 320 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989)). This was a direct
nod to the Court's invitation for Congress to act on this issue.
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 Id.
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business. z9' As Professor Hellerstein has noted, it is "a constitution we are
expounding,"'2 92 and different protections for different industries is not the
norm-even if one industry benefits (or is perceived to benefit) more than
another.
For these reasons, retailers' reliance interests on Quill stand on firm
ground (even if the theoretical basis for the physical-presence rule does
not). The remedy, then, is not for the Court to determine that the Commerce
Clause has shifted such that it no longer provides protection to remote
vendors; it is to compel Congressional action setting forth a prospective
rule after due debate and deliberation. 93 That assumes, of course, that such
action is deemed desirable.
Professor Swain also criticizes the Stare Decisis Quill by pointing to
the burdens that the physical-presence test imposes on states-providing
a competitive disadvantage to in-state merchants, reducing state tax
collections, and impacting overall economic efficiency. 94 This analysis
adequately highlights the difficulties that states encounter when remote
vendors do not collect their sales or use taxes on transactions with customers
in their states. However, each of those ills is only indirectly attributable to
the physical-presence test. The inability of a state to collect its use tax from
a remote vendor does not have any impact on the imposition of that tax.
The use tax is fundamentally and directly a tax on the in-state consumer.
That tax is due regardless of whether the remote vendor collects the tax.
Any competitive disadvantage, reduced tax revenue, or inefficiencies are
thus caused first and foremost by consumer noncompliance in reporting
and paying that tax. 29s
Admittedly, this analysis presents a pristine view of the universe. In
actuality, use-tax compliance is very low and it is much simpler for a state
to collect its use tax from merchants rather than from the merchants'
291 Of course, to discount the stare decisis effect based upon a viewpoint of what taxpay-
ers should have viewed as fair begs the question of fairness itself.
292 HELLERSTEIN, supra note 16, '1 6.o2[z] (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316,407 (1819) (emphasis in original)).
293 For more on this point, see Arthur R. Rosen & Matthew P. Hedstrom, Quill-Stare
at the Decisision, 60 STATE TAx NOTES 931, 93 1-36 (201 I) (providing a vigorous defense of
Quil's stare decisis rationale and urging that any action will (and should) be taken by Congress
and not the Court). See also Edward A. Zelinsky, The Siren Song of 'Amazon' Laws: The Colorado
Example, 59 STATE TAX NOTES 695, 695 (2011).
294 Swain, supra note 177, at 36o-61.
295 It is also too simple to distill a competitive advantage down to these tax-collection
requirements. Brick-and-mortar operations and Internet retailers each have advantages and
disadvantages over the other. Just as Internet retailers may benefit by lower tax compliance
burdens, they suffer from slower access to consumers, shipping delays and costs, and the lack
of a local presence for customer service and advertising purposes. Attributing an absolute
competitive advantage to remote vendors based on sales tax preferences ignores the wide
variety of market factors at play. Local and Internet retailing are not on equal planes but for
sale and use taxes.
[Vol. loo
FADING BRIGHT PHYSICAL PRESENCE
-multitudes of customers. However, increased difficulty of administration
does not change the fundamental issues facing states-consumer ignorance
about, and noncompliance with, their use-tax duties. The plight of state
revenue authorities in attempting to promote compliance is noteworthy and
unfortunate, but the negative effects that it creates should not be attributed
to the physical-presence test. Constitutional protections routinely require
government to seek out less efficient means for enforcing its laws.z96 Good
administrative and tax policy do not automatically trump Constitutional
policy.
2. Undue Burdens.-Professor Swain limits Burdens Quillto a concern about
small retailers 97 who have limited contacts with many states 98 However,
as Professor Swain recognizes, this concern is not actually stated by the
Court."9 It could be equally true that the Court was concerned that any
burden on remote vendors (whether large or small) was undue.
The nearest that the Quill Court came to discussing its concerns in
this area was in footnote six of its decision.3" That footnote discussed
the potential burdens that use-tax collection requirements could have on
interstate commerce if they applied to taxpayers with little contact with
a state. However, the Court did not indicate that its burdens analysis was
limited to such taxpayers. The Court followed footnote six with a discussion
of the evolution of its Commerce Clause decisions, but held that "[u]ndue
burdens on interstate commerce may be avoided not only by a case-by-
case evaluation of the actual burdens imposed by particular regulations or
taxes, but also, in some situations, by the demarcation of a discrete realm
of commercial activity that is free from interstate taxation." 0' This is not
language lamenting burdens on particular taxpayers, but language more
akin to a determination that any burden may be "undue" in this realm.
296 Take, for example, the Fourth Amendment's prohibitions on unreasonable searches
or seizures or the Fifth Amendment's protection from self-incrimination or its requirement of
Due Process. Each of those provisions requires states to seek less efficient means for enforc-
ing their laws than may otherwise be available. However, those burdens are not sufficient to
justify a retreat from the fundamental Constitutional protections that are their cause. This is
not to say that the Constitutional protection should be free from debate, but that the debate
is not settled by focusing on the burdens that a Constitutional protection may place on states.
297 For purposes of this discussion, references to "small" or "large" retailers refer only
to the magnitude of such retailers' commercial connections to a state, not the overall size of
their enterprises.
298 Swain, supra note 177, at 363.
299 Id. ("Though not clearly stated, the Court's burdens concern seems to be that busi-
nesses with low volume contacts with multiple states may have costs of compliance that are
excessive in comparison to the amount of business done in those states and to the taxes that
would be collected." (emphasis added)).
300 See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298,313 n.6 (1992).
301 Quill, 504 U.S. at 314-15.
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The Court's additional analysis provides more of the same. The Court
followed its burdens discussion by addressing the artificiality of its bright-
line rule and explaining that the artificiality was "more than offset by the
benefits of a clear rule" (i.e., "firmly establish[ing] the boundaries of..
. state authority," "encourag[ing] settled expectations," and "foster[ing]
investment").3 °0 The Court then discussed the benefits of settled
expectations before concluding. its analysis. Nowhere in this additional
analysis did the Court indicate a concern for small retailers over large
retailers. Rather, the Court adopted a position where any burden is undue
where the burdened party is an out-of-state taxpayer without a physical
presence in the taxing state. Thus, even if the Court was concerned about
small retailers, nothing in its opinion tips its hand to that effect.3"3 This
reading of Quillmay not produce a result that matches up with contemporary
normative beliefs about tax policy, but it is more supported on the face of
Quill than a reading that limits the Quill Court's analysis to an expression of
concern for small retailers.3"
Professor Swain also refers gently to the improvements made by the
SSUTA in his Burdens Quill analysis. The Oklahoma legislature and the
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Governing Board have been much more
aggressive on that front.30 One should not downplay the SSUTA and the
uniformity that it has brought. However, in a similar vein, those efforts
should not be oversold. True, twenty-four states have adopted its basic
structure. Compared to the state of the law in 1992, this is an impressive
feat. Using 1992 as the benchmark, however, misplaces the argument.
Even if some uniformity has been achieved, current law provides little
comfort to multistate enterprises. The Streamlined Sales and Use Tax
Governing Board itself recognizes that its member states represent just
302 Id. at 315-16. The Court also pointed to the rule as assisting in the growth of the
mail-order industry between National Bdlas Hess and Quill. This rationale applies equally to-
day to the Internet retailing industry. The simplified system of tax collection begot by the
physical-presence rule has made it possible to quickly and efficiently do business through
electronic means without worrying about the multiplicity of state rules and regulations at-
tached to sales and use tax compliance.
303 Of course, the opinion can be read that way if one assumes that such a concern
would be the only way for the Court to have come to its conclusion. The problem with that
analysis is that it rests upon an initial determination that large retailers are not unduly bur-
dened by a nexus standard other than physical-presence. That conclusion may be accurate,
but it is not the Court's.
304 Even if the Court did not intend that any burdens were undue where a retailer did
not have a physical presence, a focus on "small" retailers would be too much of an exercise
in relativity. The burdens of multistate tax compliance are very real even for large retailers. It
is no small relief to such taxpayers to say that those costs are dwarfed by their sales or activi-
ties, especially where those sales or activities do not necessarily translate to a higher level of
profitability.
305 See supra text accompanying note 171.
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a third of the population of the United States.3°6 Major population and
commercial centers, including New York, California, Illinois, and Texas are
non-members.3 7 Further, even a state's status as a signatory to the SSUTA
does not mean that its laws are fully uniform with other SSUTA members'
laws. Taxpayers still must evaluate each state's laws to determine whether
and where they differ from the SSUTA norm.
The reality is that the SSUTA does not yet provide the great sense
of uniformity and simplicity that both states and taxpayers would hope.
Further, mere improvement from 1992 simply does not appear sufficient to
claim that the current-day structure provides relief from the concerns noted
by the Quill Court. Perhaps someday the SSUTA will achieve such wide
and uniform adoption that its proponents can truly argue that the project
has made multistate compliance constitutionally insignificant. Until then,
the arguments based on simplification and uniformity are weakened in the
face of the current state of affairs in sales and use taxation.
As a final point with respect to Burdens Quill, the Court was not
blind to the rule's artificiality.3"8 Indeed, as discussed above, the Court
noted that such artificiality was "more than offset by the benefits of a
clear rule" (i.e., "firmly establish[ing] boundaries of ... state authority",
"encourag[ing] settled expectations", and "foster[ing] investment").3°
None of those benefits have changed since Quill. Abandoning that bright-
line rule would therefore sacrifice those benefits in exchange for a facts-
and-circumstances test requiring a quantitative analysis that courts are
poorly suited to adopt or apply.310 Such a test would thus leave room for
the controversy and confusion that the Quill Court purposefully prevented
with its adoption of the physical-presence test.3" This factor also counsels
towards Congressional action rather than state-driven change.
3. Passage of Time.-The passage of time has undoubtedly changed the
economic realities present when the Quill court reaffirmed the physical-
306 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 181.
307 Conforming legislation has been introduced in Illinois and Texas, among other
states. Id.
308 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298,315 (1992).
309 Id. at 315-i6.
310 In this regard, see Swain, supra note 177, at 364.
311 Quill, 504 U.S. at 315-16. To say that the physical-presence test has prevented con-
troversy or confusion does not mean that it has prevented all controversy or confusion. The
physical-presence rule only prevents litigation on one side (i.e., taxpayers without a physical
presence). See supra note 83. Litigation has continued with respect to taxpayers who had only
a minimal physical presence in the taxing state. See HELLERSTEIN, supra note 16, 19.0215]
[a]; Laskin, supra note IO9, at i n.46. However, this continued litigation does not negate the
value that the test has provided. For each controversy that has occurred regarding minimal
physical presence, countless others regarding economic presence may have been avoided. A
useful prevention tool is useful even if it does not prevent all controversy.
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presence test. This factor, along with Congress's inaction since that case
was decided, may give reason for the Court to offer its hand at this time.31
Consider, however, that taxpayers would equally argue that Congress's
continued inaction (coupled with the lively debate regarding this test)
could counsel towards a continued adherence to the physical-presence test
unless Congress intervenes. That may be preferable, as well, because the
test has taken on a political overtone at this point and may be a matter for
legislative action.
As a final point, none of the reasons presented as justifications for
Quills rejection (other than perhaps the uniformity efforts of the SSUTA)
are particularly different than the arguments addressed by the Quill
court. Indeed, one could see the same decision, with the same rationale,
being issued today under a different name. The North Dakota Supreme
Court's references to "the tremendous social, economic, commercial, and
legal innovations" since National Bellas Hess3"3 are no different than the
arguments presented for Quill's demise today. Disappearing Ink Quill
thus has the same significance as its brethren and further indicates that
the continued viability of Quill is properly addressed by Congress, not the
courts.
CONCLUSION
The physical-presence test currently is under immense pressure from
many directions. State fiscal crises have magnified the issues created by
the sales and use tax gap. States thus are seeking new ways to extend their
enforcement powers, while, in most cases, abiding by the Supreme Court's
physical-presence mandate. The Iowa Supreme Court's decision in KFC
offers an interesting view into how such an extension might take shape.
Ultimately, however, that expansion should be seen as nothing more than
a rejection of Quill.
Never before has the United States Supreme Court determined that
a state could impose a use-tax collection obligation on a vendor without
an actual physical presence in the taxing state. This standard has suffered
from erosion in the context of state income taxes and has been clarified
with respect to the use of in-state agents, but has not been eroded to the
point determined by the KFC court. Quill stands today as it stood in 1992-
a bright-line rule that is inherently arbitrary, decreases litigation, increases
investment, and provides settled expectations. Recent state frustration
with changes to the marketplace and the difficulty faced by states in trying
to collect use tax from those who are clearly responsible for that tax do not
change this fundamental doctrine.
312 Recall that the Quill court noted only that it would withhold its hand "for now."
Quill, 504 U.S. at 318.
313 State v. Quill, 470 N.W.2d 203, 2o8 (N.D. i991).
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All of this is not to say that the physical-presence test is conceptually
the "right" answer or the answer that is the most intellectually satisfying.
The rule is both under-inclusive and over-inclusive, and admittedly suffers
from defect. The question of its legitimacy, however, has been determined
by the Court. Unless and until Congress acts to either affirm or reject that
test, Quill's bright-line test should continue to shine.

